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This Essay is about a market-I call it the "market for loyalties"-in
which large-scale competitors for power, in a shuffle for allegiances, often use
the regulation of communications to organize a cartel of imagery and identity
among themselves. Government is usually the mechanism that allows the cartel
to operate and is often part of the cartel itself. This market produces "national
identity," to use the European term, or "community," to use the less
discriminating Americanism.' Management of the market yields the collection
of myths, ideas, and narratives employed by a dominant group or coalition to
maintain power. For that reason alone, control over participation in the market
has been, for many countries, a condition of political stability.
The market for loyalties has existed everywhere and at all times. What
differs about today's market is the range of participants, the scope of its
boundaries, and the nature of the regulatory bodies capable of establishing and
enforcing rules for participation and exclusion. This market metaphor may help
to explain the legal and political responses to the dramatic transformations now
underway in media industries as telecommunications become more global,
t Joseph and Sadie Danciger Professor of Law. Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law. Ycsluva
University. My thanks to Ad Van Loon, Legal Expert of the Audiovisual Observatory of the Council of
Europe, who provided helpful comments on earlier drafts. A grant from the John and Mary R. Marklc
Foundation supported research for this Essay.
1. I develop this definition of national identity in TELEvISION. THE PUBLIC SPHERE AND NATIoNAL
IDENTtTY (forthcoming 1995); see also PHILIP SCHLESINGER. MEDIA. STATE AND NATION: POLITICAL
VIOLENCE AND COLLECTIVE IDENTMES 137-75 (1991).
The Yale Law Journal
eluding the reach of national legislation. As new forms of communica-
tion-satellites, electronic highways, relentlessly global telephony-transcend
existing political boundaries, they call into question historic political ties and
threaten to destabilize existing national and multilateral regimes.2
In Part I of this Essay, I describe the workings of a market for loyalties,
distinguishing it from a market for goods and from a marketplace of ideas and
illustrating its operation in countries, particularly in Western Europe. In Part
II, I focus on constitutional, statutory, and administrative aspects of media
regulation in the United States to demonstrate that the market for loyalties
functions within the context of the First Amendment. In Part III, I argue that
changes in media technology are creating new global pressures in the market
for loyalties, altering the capacity of governments to perform their historic
function of regulating their own segment of the market and transforming local,
national, and global regulatory arrangements.
I. DEFINING THE MARKET
A. Elements of the Market for Loyalties
The market for loyalties must be contrasted with the "marketplace of
ideas," the compelling metaphor that has played so substantial a role in the
development of First Amendment jurisprudence in the twentieth century. The
marketplace of ideas is a particular incarnation of the market for loyalties, one
that has an established definition and a history of proponents and detractors.
3
An active, thriving bazaar with atomized buyers and sellers, the marketplace
of ideas is, in its purest form, free from anticompetitive conduct. Ease of entry
is assumed, and the government plays a limited role, if it plays any role at all.
Because truth is thought to prevail in the resulting competition among ideas,
no governmental regulation of competition is justified. The market for
loyalties, as a model, more closely approximates actual market practice than
does the marketplace of ideas. Like the market for goods, the marketplace of
ideas frequently reflects monopolistic and oligopolistic practices, including
efforts by competitors to exclude new entrants.
2. See generally THOMAS L. MCPHAIL, ELECTRONIC COLONIALISM: THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL
BROADCASTING AND COMMUNICATION (1981).
3. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616,624-31 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (advocating free
exchange of ideas). For a critique of the marketplace metaphor. see CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND
THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH (1993); see also MARK A. GRABER, TRANSFORMING FREE SPEECH: THlE
AMBIGUOUS LEGACY OF CIVIL LIBERTARIANISM 106-12 (1991) (suggesting that Holmes' dramatic use of
marketplace metaphor failed to solve constitutional dilemma of free speech); JOHN KEANE, THE MEDIA AND
DEMOCRACY 123 (1991) (arguing that rich vocabulary of market liberalism should neither be neglected nor




It is easier to describe a market for goods than a market for loyalties. ' In
a market for automobiles or sugar, well-developed traditions identify buyers
and sellers, determine a market-clearing price, and describe the means for
settling accounts. Extensive literature exists on monopolistic and oligopolistic
practices affecting markets for goods and on the legal, regulatory, and
negotiated arrangements governing prices and the division of markets. For
centuries, theorists have debated the power of the state to favor domestic
products and shield industries from foreign competition. Even in countries that
pride themselves on their commitment to a free-market economy, government
can play a dramatic role in establishing the rules of the game, encouraging
production, and striking a balance between protectionism and unregulated
competition.5
There is little in the way of a similar literature identifying the buyers and
sellers of ideology and the nature of transactions among them.6 For example,
the supply side in the market for loyalties has a structure that is badly served
by reductionist terms like "state," or "government," or "political party." The
sellers in this market are all those for whom myths and dreams and history can
somehow be converted into power and wealth--classically states, governments,
interest groups, businesses, and others. The "buyers" are the citizens, subjects,
nationals, consumers-recipients of the packages of information, propaganda,
advertisements, drama, and news propounded by the media. The consumer
"pays" for one set of identities or another in several ways that, together, we
call "loyalty" or "citizenship. 7 Payment, however, is not expressed in the
ordinary coin of the realm: It includes not only compliance with tax
obligations, but also obedience to laws, readiness to fight in the armed
4. For efforts to relate economic analysis to speech issues. see BRUCE M. OwEN. ECONOMICS AND
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION: MEDIA STRUCTURE AND THE FIRST AMENDMENr (1975): R.H. Coase,
Advertising and Free Speech, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1977); R.H. Coase, The Market for Goods and the
Market for Ideas. 64 AM. ECON. REV. PAPERS & PROC. 384 (1974). For a discussion of the market for
speech itself, see Stephen A. Gardbaum, Broadcasting. Democracy, and the Market. 82 GEo. LJ. 373
(1993).
5. The move towards "industrial policies" in many countries and the development of trade
arrangements, including the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GAIT). the North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and the European Union (EU). represent a renaissance in the collaboration of
government and business to organize markets.
6. One example is ANTHONY DOWNS. AN ECONOMIC'MTEORY OF DEmOCRACY 207-76 (1957) (arguing
that information always imposes some costs on consumers, at least of time and attention: and the problem.
in terms of efficiency, is to convert these costs into payments to producers); see also CHARLES UNDBLO.I.
POLITICS AND MARKETS 13 (1977) (comparing role of persuasion in communist and liberal democratic
societies). But cf. Associated Press v. United States. 326 U.S. 1. 28 (1945) (Frankfurter, J.. concumng)
("Truth and understanding are not wares like peanuts or potatoes."). Justice Frankfurter contended that the
constraints on the market for speech "call ... into play considerations very different from comparable
restraints in a cooperative enterprise having merely a commercial aspect." Id.
7. See generally GEORGE P. FLETCHER., LOYALTY: AN ESSAY ON THE MORALITY OF RELATIO.sHIIPS
(1993) (examining tension between allegiance to community and self-centered solutions, including exiting
from institutions).
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services, or even continued residence within the country.9 The buyer also
pays with his or her own sense of identity.
The payment of taxes as evidence of one's loyalty provides an interesting
example. In most modem societies, because of the complexity of social and
business transactions, strict compliance with tax regimes is somewhat
voluntary. Since New York City charges an income tax over and above that
of its state, some residents move to Long Island, New Jersey, or Connecticut
to avoid it. Many of those who remain have, for complex reasons, no choice.
But for others, there is a degree of loyalty manifested by their willingness to
pay the additional cost of adhesion.'
Compliance with the draft is not a perfect sign of a community's loyalty
to its government because of a history of exemptions, deferrals, inequities, and,
ultimately, the end of conscription. But studies of compliance, desertion, or the
burdens of raising an army through means other than conscription suggest that
the cost of loyalty is sometimes quite high." History is studded with cases
where mass desertion has meant the end of an empire; where, all of a sudden,
the duty to fight for a particular cause can no longer be enforced.'
2
B. Media Law and Restrictions on Competition
Legislation is commonly used by the controlling group or groups in the
market to enforce and reinforce identities useful to them. Such legislation
allocates market shares, with the intent of creating cartels of allegiances where
possible. As in the market for goods, competitors in the market for loyalties
seek to use the force of law, as well as collusion, to restrict supply and
8. This assumes consumer choice, exercised by an autonomous individual with some modicum of
preference. For an example, see the discussion on personal choice in Mark Kelman, Consumption Theory,
Production Theory, and Ideology in the Coase Theorem, 52 S. CAL. L. REV. 669 (1979). Loyalty becomes
obedience in the most authoritarian of markets.
9. See ALBERT 0. HIRSCHMAN, Exrr, VOICE, AND LOYALTY (1970) (studying alternatives open to
citizens). For a review of human rights provisions concerning the right to emigrate and its relationship to
state sovereignty, see Francis A. Gabor, Reflections on the Freedom of Movement in Light of the
Dismantled "Iron Curtain", 65 TUL. L. REV. 849 (1991).
10. The effect of tax rates and regulatory costs on mobility is the subject of debate in a series of recent
articles. See, e.g., Vicki Been, Exit as a Constraint on Land Use Exactions: Rethinking the Unconstitutional
Conditions Doctrine, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 473, 516-25 (1991); Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part
l-Localism and Legal Theory, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 346 (1990). See generally Charles A. Tiebout, A Pure
Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416, 418, 420 (1956).
11. For a survey, see Richard H. Pildes, The Unintended Cultural Consequences of Public Policy: A
Comment on the Symposium, 89 MICH. L. REV. 936, 943-45 (1991); see also Susan Rose-Ackerman,
Inalienability and the Theory of Property Rights, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 931, 936 (1985) (distinguishing
alienable rights and duties of citizenship from inalienable rights and duties of citizenship).
12. Jacques Ellul recognized these notions of allegiance in describing the cost of modernity and its
loyalties: The 20th-century citizen, he wrote, is "saddled by his government with ... sacrifices, such as
ever-increasing taxes" that are increasingly paid out of manufactured conviction, not overt force. The
modem consumer of loyalties, he said of his time, must "participate in wars such as have never been seen
before." JACQUES ELLUL, PROPAGANDA: THE FORMATION OF MEN'S AITIDES 142 (Konrad Kellen &
Jean Lerner trans., 1965).
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establish barriers to entry.' 3 For instance, worldwide, government-operated
and -controlled companies with established monopolies over communications
technology have fought the introduction of private competition or the
expansion of cable television.' 4 Controlling which viewpoints have access to
the means of mass communication either can serve as an integrating and
assimilating influence that subtly reinforces a vision of cohesion, or can
reinforce existing cultural divisions in society.' 5 In Italy, for example, the
very architecture of public broadcasting was designed to accommodate the
existing system of political parties, with the Christian Democrats controlling
the first channel, the Socialists the second, and the former Communists the
third. 16  In Germany, by constitution and statute, public broadcasting
corporations must adhere to a rule of "internal pluralism" supervised by a
Rundfunkrat, or council, chosen in such a way that all of society's opinions,
values, interests, and perspectives are adequately represented.' 7 The statutory
13. It is possible to view a number of techniques--dcfamation laws. diseriminatory tax policies.
ideology-based restrictions on travel---as methods of influencing the composition and operation of the
market for loyalties. Integrating all of these interrelationships between state and narratve is beyond the
scope of this Essay. Here, I focus on the subtle and virtually universal use of media law and regulation to
control competition and to assure the presence, absence, and strength of particular producers of loyalties
in the market. I postpone discussion of the American case until Part If because the use of media law to
regulate competition has historically been far more transparent in the European context. See generally Eta
NOAM, TELEVISION IN EUROPE (1991) (containing country-by-country analysis).
14. ERIC BARENDT, BROADCASTING LAW 13-14.22.25 (1993) (explaining how govcrnmcnt-controlled
communications companies fought expansion of private competition in France, Germany. Italy. and the
United Kingdom).
15. The use of law to assure market access has its benign face: The Republic of Ireland, in not atypical
language, requires its public broadcasting system to
be responsive to the interests of the whole community, be mindful of the need for understanding
and peace within the whole island of Ireland. ensure that the programmes reflect the varied
elements which make up the culture of people of the whole island of Ireland. and have special
regard for the elements which distinguishes [sic) that culture and in particular for the Irish
language.
Broadcasting Authority Act, No. 10, § 17 (1960) (amended 1976); see Ad Van Loon, Pluralism
Concentration and Competition in the Media Sector, CDMM(92)8 at 208. Swedish television, by agreement
between the state and the major national broadcasting service, must pay special consideration to linguistic
and ethnic minorities so "as to meet to all reasonable extent, by its quality, accessibility and variety, the
differing needs and interests of the population." Id. at 303. A Slovenian draft statute of the early 1990's
imposes upon the public media responsibility "for the preservation of Slovenian national identity." At the
same time, the draft, recognizing the rights of Italian and Hungarian minorities, provides that if a newspaper
or television station is established to service these minorities, those communities must be consulted in the
preparation of significant content as well as in the appointment and dismissal of the editor. See Monroe E.
Price, Comparing Broadcast Structures: Transnational Perspectives and Post-Communist Examples. I I
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 275, 301-03 (1993) (quoting Slovenia Draft Law on Public Media. Dec. 19,
1991, art. 2).
16. For a recent account of the crumbling of this architecture. see Robert Graham. PM Rules the
Airwaves: How Berlusconi Won Control of Broadcasting, FIN. TunMEs (London). July 2. 1994, at 4: see also
Donald Sassoon, Italy: The Advent of Private Broadcasting, in THE POLITICS OF BROADCASTING 119
(Raymond Kuhn ed., 1985).
17. See VINCENT PORTER & SUZANNE HASSELBACH. PLURALISM, POLITICS AND THE MARKETPLACE:
THE REGULATION OF GERMAN BROADCASTING 1-6 (1991). In practice, however. direct public participation
is limited. See id. at 56.
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ideal is for broadcasting to mirror society's composition, but the consequence
has been a rough parceling out of licenses among dominant political parties."8
Issues of cohesion and identity arise in the broader context of European
integration. Under Article 10(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms, the right to freedom of expression embraces the
right to receive information and ideas without regard to frontiers.' 9 In 1990,
the European Court of Human Rights added teeth to this provision in
Groppera Radio A.G. v. Switzerland2" and Autronic A.G. v. Switzerland.2'
In those cases, the Court ruled that Article 10 rights apply not only to the
printed press but also to radio and television. Although the court acknowledged
a limited right for receiving states to protect their technical licensing schemes,
state-imposed barriers to transfrontier television would generally offend the
principles set out in the Convention.22 The Television Broadcasting Directive
of the European Community,23 and the virtually equivalent European
Convention on Transfrontier Television of the Council of Europe,24 affirm a
regional-market approach. In the 1990's, the focus has shifted from the
regulation of transmission across the borders of individual European states to
the protection, mainly through the imposition of quotas, of European program
production from foreign attack?25 During the negotiations of the Uruguay
Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in 1993, the European
Union (EU) sought to exclude film and television programming from the
general lowering of trade barriers on the ground that a European cultural space
ought to be preserved, strengthened, and protected from the influx of American
entertainment.26
18. In Germany, the state regulating agencies have the obligation to assure that television, especially
the public broadcasting system as a whole, represents the plurality of opinions and voices the views of the
relevant political, ideological, and social groups. See id. at 16-17. For examples of the parceling out of
channel time among interest groups, see id. at 69.
19. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4,
1950, art. 10(1), 213 U.N.T.S. 221.
20. 12 Eur. Ct. H.R. (set. A) at 321 (1990).
21. 12 Eur. Ct. H.R. (set. A) at 485 (1990).
22. See BARENDr, supra note 14, at 223-25.
23. Council Directive 89/552 of 3 October 1989 on Television Without Frontiers, 1989 OJ. (L 298)
23 [hereinafter Television Without Frontiers Directive].
24. European Convention on Transfrontier Television, May 5, 1989, Europ. T.S. No. 132; see also
Television Without Frontiers: Green Paper on the Establishment of the Common Market for Broadcasting
Especially by Satellite and Cable, COM(84)300 final (hereinafter Television Without Frontiers Green
Paper]; BARENDT, supra note 14, at 222-36. See generally THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
COMMUNICATIONS: INTERNATIONAL AND EUROPEAN DIMENSIONS (Kenneth Dyson & Peter Humphreys eds.,
1990) (discussing international political economy of telecommunications).
25. See BARENDT, supra note 14, at 235.
26. See Laurence G.C. Kaplan, The European Community's "Television Without Frontiers" Directive:
Stimulating Europe To Regulate Culture, 8 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 255, 341-45 (1994). Former European
Commission President Jacques Delors has defended the EU's position by arguing "that cultural goods are
not like other merchandise" and deserve protection because "[c]ulture is there to reassure, it is part of our
roots." Hilary Clarke, EU Vows to "Move Forward"; Consensus on Maintaining Cultural Identity Sought
as AV Confab Opens, HOLLYWOOD REP., July 1, 1994, available in LEXIS, Entert Library, Holrep File.
For the American reaction, see Hollywood Urges End to Film War, THE GUARDIAN (London), Sept. 6,
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Turkey provides a recent and dramatic historical example of government
efforts to maintain control over competition in the market for loyalties. Since
the rise of Kemal Ataturk, the Turkish government has considered Islamic
sects, groups now labeled "fundamentalists," a threat to the secular state and
has sought to limit the use of the mass media by these religious competitors.
Turkish Radio and Television Authority (TRT) has not only been monopolistic,
"it [has] also essentially [been] the voice of the state, disseminating the unitary
ideology and culture of Turkish republicanism and highly susceptible to
government intervention. 27 Charged by statute with "promoting the values
of country, unity, republic, public order, harmony, and welfare and
[strengthening] the principles of Kemal Ataturk's reforms,"-2 TRT has been
an instrument for "cohesiveness" in an environment in which there have been
deep divisions about alternate national identities. When TRT was attacked for
leaning to the left and for broadcasting programs that legitimated Islamic
fundamentalism, the agency's director general was forced to resign.'
Law also has been used to protect domestic producers of national identity
from international competition. For most of the twentieth century, the
international consensus was that radio transmissions should be contained
primarily within the boundaries of one nation; the international function,
performed mainly through the International Telecommunication Union (ITU),
was to dispense frequencies so as to assure that conditions of market division
along national borders could be realized and enforced." International
regulations and arrangements implemented the policy of limiting broadcasting,
in large part, to "national service of good quality within the frontiers of the
country concerned." 3' In the interlude between the World Wars, there were
bilateral and multilateral agreements to control propaganda subversive to the
state system. For example, the League of Nations-sponsored Convention
Concerning the Use of Broadcasting in the Cause of Peace provided that:
1994, at 7.
27. Asu Aksoy & Kevin Robins, Gecekondu-style Broadcasting in Turkey. A Confrontation of Cultural
Values, INTERMEDIA, June-July 1993. at 15; see also Haluk Sahin & Asu Aksoy. Global Media and
Cultural Identity in Turkey, 43 J. COMM. 31 (1992). In an ironic example of the competition in the market
for loyalties, state-run TRT is now beaming secular programming-a vehicle to promote a collective,
modernizing agenda-into the six Muslim republics of the former Soviet Union. Previously. the Turkish
government had censored Islamic traditionalist signals that were being sent into Turkish temitory. See Asu
Aksoy & Nabi Avci, Spreading Turkish Identity, INTERMEDIA, Aug.-SepL 1992, at 39.
28. NOAM, supra note 13, at 258.
29. Id.
30. Audrey L. Allison, Meeting the Challenges of Change: The Reform of the International
Telecommunication Union. 45 FD. COMM. L.J. 491. 496-97. 513-14 (1993): see R.H. COASE. BRTnSlt
BROADCASTING: A STUDY IN MONOPOLY 110-16 (1950) (explaining how British and international
regulation was used to limit competition from radio signals originating in France and Luxembourg and to
protect British nationhood).
31. President Pushes TVMarti; ITU Pushes Back, BROADCASTING. Apr. 9. 1990. at 37. 38 (concerning
legality of TV Martf); see also Steven Ruth, Comment, The Regulation of Spillover Transmissions from
Direct Broadcast Satellites in Europe, 42 FED. COMM. LJ. 107 (1989).
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The High Contracting Parties mutually undertake to prohibit and, if
occasion arises, to stop without delay the broadcasting within their
respective territories of any transmission which to the detriment of
good international understanding is of such a character as to incite the
population of any territory to acts incompatible with the internal order
or the security of a territory of a High Contracting Party.32
States today continue to struggle with the question of whether to use law to
protect national systems or to enhance international freedom to
communicate.33
C. Advertising as a Competitor for Identity
In a market for loyalties, promoters of disparate national identities
predictably have different attitudes toward ordinary commercial advertising on
television. 34  European governments, long preoccupied with limiting
advertising messages and protecting public broadcasters from competition, 3
tend to view the subtext of advertising as a substitute for more traditional
packages of identity. To see why, recall the position 6f the citizen in the
market for loyalties. Assume that a citizen can express loyalty in terms of
willingness to pay taxes. In this case, the seller (the government) of the
product (a kind of patriotism) must persuade the voter to spend more
disposable income on the product (through higher taxes). Taxpayers can
resist,3' and instead decide that their religious salvation, for example, is more
important than the public weal. They can vote to divert government
expenditures from the defense industries or to lower the public revenues
altogether. Or citizens can determine, through voting or other means, that they
should spend more on local taxes and less on federal taxes. Governments can
see that advertising can affect individuals' visions of the public good-for
example, by persuading them to consume rather than to save and invest,
teaching the primacy of satisfaction and loyalty to self rather than sacrifice and
32. International Convention Concerning the Use of Broadcasting in the Cause of Peace, Sept. 23,
1936, art. I, 186 L.N.T.S. 301. In the Litvinov Agreement between the United States and the U.S.S.R., both
countries promised not to spread propaganda hostile to the other and not to harbor groups working toward
the overthrow of the other. See Exchange of Communications Between the President of the United States
and Maxim M. Litvinov, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,
28 AM. J. INT'L L. 2, 3-4 (Supp. 1934).
33. See infra part III.
34. See generally STUART EWEN, CAPTAINS OF CONSCIOUSNESS: ADVERTISING AND THE SOCIAL
ROOTS OF THE CONSUMER CULTURE (1976) (discussing historical growth of advertising and its connection
to mass culture); MICHAEL SCHUDSON, ADVERTISING, THE UNEASY PERSUASION: ITS DUBIOUS IMPACT ON
AMERICAN SOCIETY (1984) (explaining current relationship between advertising and consumer culture). For
a recent effort to rethink the relationship between advertising and free speech doctrine, see C. EDWIN
BAKER, ADVERTISING AND A DEMOCRATIC PRESS (1994).
35. For a review, see BARENDT, supra note 14, at 188-212.
36. Because compliance with tax obligations is not wholly voluntary, individuals cannot freely
substitute their predilections for the collection of goals established by the state.
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loyalty to community. In this sense, marketers of "pure" national identities or
ideologies compete with sellers of consumer goods, who are trying to impress
another identity upon the citizen. The question is how a person decides, at the
margin, whether a higher or lower percentage of disposable income should go
to the state to pay for education or environmental protection or to the purchase
of personal goods like food, television sets, and automobiles."
In the market for loyalties, promoters of some patriotic identities recognize
the indirect supporting role that the barrage of traditional commercials might
play in connection with their own visions of future happiness. Take, for
example, a rather simple one-dimensional view of the Republican Party in the
United States, or the Conservative Party in the United Kingdom, or the parties
advocating a more rapid transition to a marketplace economy in Russia. These
aspirants for power may sense political benefits in a citizenry saturated with
the culture of advertising that contains indirect messages of political support.
The messages of the sellers of toothpaste and automobiles reinforce a national
identity claiming that the opportunity to have maximum choice to consume is
good. We see assertions of national identity in the interstices of commercials,
in their depiction of an idealized home life, or their depiction of a certain idea
of traditional family values.38 If the images of a consumer society bolster the
party in power, then that is reason enough for advocating an increase in
advertiser-supported broadcasting.39
Alternatively, a ruling party may see the images of advertising and the
foreign programs surrounding them as a threat both to its culture and, more
centrally, to its continued hold on power.40 In some settings, foreign programs
(usually labeled "American" for convenience and often originating in
Hollywood) are characterized as subversive; their story lines advocate a view
of the individual that is wholly at odds with the perspective of the ruling
regime.4' The regime may fear that the successful penetration of the world
37. The notion of elasticity of demand comes into play here. Sellers of ordinary goods often want to
know whether and how much an increase in price will decrease demand for their product. Manufacturers
of national identities-including the state itself-must (in the economic model) ask the same question.
38. See generally SCHUDSON, supra note 34; CECELIA TiCti. ELECTRONIC HEARTI: CREATING AN
AMERICAN TELEVISION CULTURE (1991).
39. The Conservative Party in the United Kingdom and the Chnstian Democratic Union in Germany
favored the introduction of a competing private channel partly on these grounds. See BARENDT. supra note
14, at 12; PORTER & HASSELBACH, supra note 17, at 7.
40. MARIKA N. TAISHOFF, STATE RESPONSIBILITY AND TIE DIRECT BROADCAST SATELLrE 12-13
(1987).
41. Certainly this is the view of the influence of Westem television in Malaysia. Singapore. and much
of the Islamic world. See. e.g.. ERHARD U. HEIDT, MASS MEDIA. CULTURAL TRADmON AND NATIONAL
IDENTITY 157, 160-63 (1987); JAMES LULL, CHINA TURNED ON: TELEVISION. R.FORM. AND RESISTANCE
165-66 (1991). The BBC published excerpts of recorded prayer sermons at Tcheran University on
September 16, 1994:
Satellite transmission, broadcasting the programmes of foreign television networks, is not
designed to increase the scientific knowledge of nations. Rather it has been developed to
mislead the youth.... They sell obscene films either at a very low price or give it to you free
of charge, whereas the scientific films are so expensive that one cannot afford to buy them.
They [the West] do not transfer their knowledge ... [or] their experience of modernizing
1994l
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view contained in Western advertising (and in Western news) will yield
instability and calls for internal political change.42 Islamic fundamentalists are
not the only ones who acknowledge the transformative power of Western
broadcast imagery. Supporters of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty as well
as avid proponents of free-market television have credited the images of
Western society, including its advertising, for contributing to the collapse of
the Soviet Union.43
D. Government as Speaker
To say that a government is a participant in the market for loyalties
implicates propaganda theory. Propaganda is the name that we give to the use
of symbols to influence or manipulate public opinion, 4 at home or abroad.
Among scholars, there are conflicting attitudes toward this kind of speech.
Many writers argue that the use of propaganda should not be condemned
categorically; they see it as a mainstay of all modem governments, including
democratic ones.45 But most writers on propaganda do not use a marketplace
approach, 46  as they are usually concerned with propaganda's behavioral
technology. What they transfer is something which drags families into corruption.
He [the Westerner] is planning to make the Islamic countries give up the ownership of
their chastity .... [H]e wishes to make our young people addicted to drugs ... irresponsible
towards their parents, spouses and their living conditions.
Emani-Kashani: West Interested in Transfer Not of Technology But of Corruption, BBC SUMMARY OF
WORLD BROADCASTS, available in LEXIS, News Library, BBCSWB File.
42. According to an official at China's Ministry of Radio, Film, and Television:
International satellite dissemination conducted by Western developed countries threatens the
independence and identity of China's national culture ... [which includes] loving the
motherland, hard work, advocating industry and thrift .... taking a keen interest in science,
attaching importance to culture, ... and stressing moral courage.... Precisely because of this,
we take seriously the infringement of overseas radio and television and the influence they bring
which hampers the national spirit to expand.
Zhao Shuifu, Foreign Dominance of Chinese Broadcasting-Will Hearts and Minds Follow?, INTERMEDIA,
Apr.-May 1994, at 8, 9.
43. See, e.g., PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON U.S. GOV'T INT'L BROADCASTING, U.S. DEP'T OP STATE,
PUB. No. 9925, at 5-6 (1991).
44. Richard A. Falk, On Regulating International Propaganda: A Plea for Moderate Aims, 31 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 622, 623 (1966). Of course, the definitions of propaganda are myriad. Jacques Ellul's
definition is "a set of methods employed by an organized group that wants to bring about the active or
passive participation in its actions of a mass of individuals, psychologically unified through psychological
manipulations and incorporated in an organization." ELLUL, supra note 12, at 61; see also L. JOHN MARI N,
INTERNATIONAL PROPAGANDA 10-20 (1958) (surveying proposed definitions).
45. Jacques Ellul is certainly of this school, see ELLUL, supra note 12, passim, as was Walter
Lippman, see WALTER LIPPMAN, PUBLIC OPINION (1922); cf. Kevin Robins et al., Propaganda, Information
and Social Control, in PROPAGANDA, PERSUASION AND POLEMIC 8, 16 (Jeremy Hawthorn ed., 1987)
(arguing that "propaganda and information management are normative aspects of modern democratic
societies" but "inherently totalitarian").
46. For a recent article alluding to marketplace notions and encouraging the United States to mobilize
radio to strengthen its position abroad, see Walter Laqueur, Save Public Diplomacy: Broadcasting
America's Message Matters, FOREIGN AFF., Sept.-Oct. 1994, at 19. Somewhat disingenuously, Laqueur
writes: "[W]hile America spends huge amounts selling cigarettes and soft drinks, it is not selling America."
il
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implications. They may use the metaphor of competition, but they do not
examine its analytic consequences.
The function of the government in a market for loyalties ordinarily goes
far beyond its role as regulator and enforcer for a cartel of identity producers.
The government is frequently a participant in the market for loyalties in its
own right. By my earlier definition of national identity and its role in
reinforcing the status quo,47 the government often depends on a specific range
of outcomes for its very existence. Here, the relationship between the state as
censor and the state as generator of images is important. Not only have
governments sought to exclude a range of destabilizing narratives, they have
also sought to ensure that a sense of national identity is available and, if
possible, prevails. The preoccupation with flags, including their proper
veneration, is the most obvious of such efforts. The establishment of churches,
the investment in the writing of history, state patronage of the arts as a means
of uniting a community-all of these are part of the process of reinforcing
national identity. Much of what the state provides is a public good; for
example, the benefits of security and peace are even available to those who do
not pay taxes. Still, the marketing of loyalty tends to increase the costs of
those who support the state's undertakings. There are many other reasons for
the government to become a speaker-maintaining cohesion, correcting for
widely perceived unfairness, introducing missing narratives-and thereby to
strengthen its hold on power. Historically, however, the question has been not
whether government should be a speaker, but whether it becomes a monopoly
supplier of national identity.
41
To perform its functions in regulating and participating in the market for
loyalties, government has a cluster of alternatives: It can subsidize messages
that it deems important, 9 censor messages that it deems antagonistic,5, or
47. See supra text accompanying note I.
48. For a general account of the monopoly over information in the former Soviet Union. see BRIA
MCNAIR, GLASNOST. PERESTROIKA AND TE SOVIET MEDIA 9-29 (1991). In the recent Informationsve ran
Lentia case, the European Court of Human Rights affirmed the European Commission of Human Rights'
invalidation of an Austrian law that maintained a state monopoly protecting a geographical area against
competition. Austria did not license private radio and television stations, maintaining a monopoly for the
public service provider. Austria argued that it was necessary, in a small country, to further democratic
values by maintaining tight control over the market, including the market for advertising revenues A
monopoly could assure "the objectivity and impartiality of news. the balanced reporting of all shades of
opinion and the independence of the persons and bodies responsible for the programmes.-
Informationsverein Lentia v. Austria. No. 36/1992/3811455-459 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Nov. 24. 1993)
49. See Turner Broadcasting Sys.. Inc. v. FCC. 114 S. Ct. 2445. 2478 (1994) (O'Connor. J.. concumng
in part and dissenting in part) (conceding that -the government may subsidize speakers that it thinks
provide novel points of view"). The effort in the United States to ensure increased minority ownership of
broadcasting licenses in order to encourage greater pluralism in the social narrative is another example- See
Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990) (upholding minority preferences in granting
broadcast licenses).
50. But see International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, openedfor signature Dec 19. 1966.
art. 19(2), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 178 (entered into force Mar. 23. 1976) (right to freedom of expression)
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even become a vocal contributor in the market.51 And these alternatives are
interrelated: Other things being equal, the pressure for censorship increases
where the government and other dominant suppliers have not successfully
agreed on an acceptable range of narratives and the state itself has limited
power to generate images of cohesion and loyalty.
E. The Netherlands and Belgium as Examples
The Netherlands and Belgium have elegant histories of media regulation
that illustrate, in finer detail than most countries, the interaction between
government and other suppliers of identity within a market for loyalties. The
Dutch experience provides a graphic illustration of how broadcasting statutes,
once instruments for mediating among long-established rival groups, can no
longer effectively perform this function because of technological changes and
shifts in European law. Dutch regulation had long protected a cartel of
broadcasters from foreign competition. The rise of cable and satellite, in
addition to the requirements of the Treaty of Rome,52 have prevented the state
from continuing to promote a national identity through the media.
At the heart of the Dutch tradition is a vision of a society comprising
"pillarized" segments-some religious groups, some secular groups-each of
which maintains a stable identity. Rather than having a single state broadcaster,
the Dutch long ago established a complex mechanism that gave each segment
of society an unencumbered opportunity to broadcast to its own community,
first on radio, then on television. Groups competed for broadcast time, with
awards linked to the number of members or adherents each group could
claim. 3  Through informal internal sanctions,54  these broadcasting
organizations reinforced separate visions of Dutch identity. As a result, Dutch
society remained pluralistic, with each group speaking to its own members and
not proselytizing the others.
51. See Steven Shiffrin, Government Speech, 27 UCLA L. REV. 565, 571 (1980) (exploring ways to
"integrate government speech into our constitutional constellation").
52. TREATY OF ROME, tit. II.
53. Currently, there are three categories of associations. Category A, which obtains the most time, is
reserved for associations with 450,000 members or more; Category B encompasses associations with
memberships ranging from 300,000 to 450,000; and Category C associations have from 150,000 to 300,000
adherents. Broadcasting time is divided in a ratio of 5:3:1. Netherlands Media Act, art. 34, 1987 Stb. 249
(Neth.); see Willem F. Korthals Altes, European Law: A Case Study of Changes in National Broadcasting,
II CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 313, 317 n.21 (1993). The modem practice is to become a member of an
organization because one likes its radio and television programming, not because of a commitment to its
principles. Exceptions are VPRO, a liberal entity supported by intellectuals because of its contribution to
new ideas, and EO. an evangelical broadcasting organization.
54. During the period of radio dominance, for example, the bishops of the Catholic province of the
Netherlands issued a "mandement" in which they recommended that their community not listen to the
emissions of the socialist VARA broadcasting organization. See generally A.F. Manning, Ult ie




Included groups sought to protect against the extension of broadcasting
rights to groups promoting alternative identities, recognizing that any
expansion of the zone of narratives would challenge their ability to maintain
the loyalty of their members. As elsewhere in Europe, so-called "pirates"
attempted to compete outside the constraints of the legally sanctioned oligopoly
by broadcasting radio signals from international waters. Their competing
message incorporated elements of the new global culture: rock-and-roll and its
siren call to youth. Traditional associations, draped in their commitment to
historic Dutch identities, sought with the aid of the government to exclude the
new entrants. They contended, for example, that the pirate broadcaster
Veronica did not "'sufficiently address[] society's cultural, religious or spiritual
needs,' as required by Article 13 of the Broadcasting Act.""5  An
administrative judgment in favor of the intruders was based on a novel
statutory interpretation: that the absence of a particular religious philosophy or
view about the conduct of life did not prevent an organization from fulfilling
the cultural needs of society.5 6 As a temporary but ultimately doomed
measure, the Dutch Parliament amended the Broadcast Law to require that an
association or group seeking a broadcast license represent not just a
commercial interest, but a social, cultural, religious, or spiritual viewpoint."
With the advent of cable television, attempts to raise barriers to entry
resurfaced. The government-protected suppliers of particular national identities,
already weakened by competition from the centrist, popular, and now legal
pirates, feared transborder competition from foreign channels carried on cable
franchises. To address these concerns, the government adopted rules precluding
cable operators from carrying foreign programming containing commercial
advertisements specifically directed at the Dutch market. 5 Ultimately, as a
result of a decision of the European Court of Justice, the Dutch government
could not forestall the entry of foreign programming."
As an example of the workings of the market for loyalties, this history of
broadcasting in the Netherlands is illuminating. The Dutch system was
explicitly designed to identify and promote alternative proponents of national
identities, allocate markets among them, and exclude others who might reduce
55. Altes, supra note 53, at 318 (quoting Broadcasting Act. art. 13. 1967 Stb. 176 (Ncth.)).
56. Royal Decree of Afdeling Contentieux van de Raad van State, KB 26.08.1975; see also Decision
AB 77,29 (1977) (confirming Royal Decree KB 26.08.1975).
57. Joke J.A. Pelle & Piet W.C. Akkermans. The Dutch Broadcasting System: A Basic Right Caught
Between Dutch Constitutional Law and European Community Law. 2 RED/ERPL 39. 41 (1990).
58. Three European Court of Justice cases discuss the complexity resulting from Dutch cfforts to
regulate transfrontier advertising. See Case 353/89, Commission v. Netherlands, 1991 E.C.R. 1-4069; Case
288/89. Stichting Collectieve Antennevoorziening Gouda v. Commissariaat Voor de Media. 1991 E.C.R.
1-4007; Case 325/85, Bond Van Adverteerders v. The State (Netherlands). 1988 E.C.R. 2085.
59. See Commission v. Netherlands, 1991 E.C.R. at 1-4069 (holding as violative of Article 59 of the
EEC treaty a Dutch regulation that sought to impose on foreign broadcasters obligations similar to those
required of Dutch broadcasters). Under the European Union's Broadcasting Directive, no member
government is permitted, except under extremely unusual situations. to prohibit the transmission of
programs that are legally broadcast in a member country of origin. See BAREzCDT. supra note 14. at 234.
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the identified proponents' market share. When foreign signals invaded, the
"pillars" realized that commercial programming could displace the packages
that promoted traditional and protected versions of national identity. As society
evolved in the 1960's and 1970's, demand for traditional public service
programming (provided by the pillarized groups) proved highly elastic.
Whatever need existed for a bundle of national identity ideals could be
otherwise satisfied, and audiences were not willing to pay in terms of quality,
entertainment, or reduced satisfaction for the virtues of the groups with which
they had long been affiliated. Increased competition reinforced and accelerated
"depillarization." 6 Competition from abroad thus altered the capacity of the
state to preserve a cartel among the existing competitors for loyalty, and
limited the ability of local and regional providers, proponents of discrete and
insular cultures, to use the media to market their particular identities.
61
The Belgian experience parallels that of the Netherlands. The unitary
system in Belgium began to fracture in as early as 1960, reflecting the gulf
between the French-speaking and Flemish-speaking communities. 62 Three
public organizations supplanted the Belgisch Nationaal Instituut voor de Radio-
Omroep (NIR): One was responsible for French-language broadcasting, the
second was responsible for Flemish-language broadcasting, and a third targeted
French- and Flemish-speaking communities as well as the German minority,
also providing technical, administrative, and financial services to all
broadcasters. A constitutional amendment in the early 1970's shifted control
away from these organizations to the more local and discrete "Culture
Councils" in Flemish-speaking Flanders and the French-speaking Walloon
provinces.63 By 1977, a pact among the competitors for national identity
expanded opportunities for each group to reinforce loyalties. This pact
weakened and finally dissolved the central coordinating mechanisms, so that
each community could determine the structure of its own broadcasting
organization.' 4 At least formally, the potential competitors had successfully
arranged a strict division of markets.
In the 1980's, an appetite developed, particularly in the Flemish-speaking
community, for an alternative to the publicly financed monopoly. The means
by which the community sought to assure an economic base for a Flemish
commercial station and presumably to preserve and strengthen Flemish
language use demonstrate the intricacy of market-sharing efforts. The Flemish
business interests and political parties agreed on two principles: First, a
60. Predictably, the traditional associations attempted to maintain their audience by broadening their
programming beyond a narrow conception of national identity.
61. See generally Aemout J. Nieuwenhuis, The Crumbling Pillars of Dutch TV, INTERMEDIA,
Aug.-Sept. 1992, at 37 (discussing "depillarization" of Dutch broadcasting system).
62. See Clristine De Keersmaeker, Organisation and Structure of Radio and Television Broadcasting
in Belgium, ENT. L. REV., Sept.-Oct. 1992. at 164.
63. See Van Loon, supra note 15, at 81.
64. De Keersmaeker, supra note 62, at 164.
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Flemish station required monopoly status in order to survive; second, the
Flemish newspaper industry could only survive the introduction of the Flemish
station if it owned fifty-one percent of the station. The decree incorporating
this agreement, implemented in 1987, also would have barred local cablecasters
from carrying programs of public television stations of European Community
member states if the programs were not produced in the original language of
the member state in which the station was located. The rule's purpose was to
prevent foreign broadcasters, other than the Dutch, from targeting the Flemish-
speaking audience in Flanders. The European Court of Justice, based on Article
59 of the Rome Treaty, held the language requirements discriminatory and
illegal.65 As in the Netherlands, the major elements of the finely crafted
compromise formally remained in place, but technological and legal events
rendered the delicate market divisions of marginal significance.
F. The Market and Societies in Transition
The dynamics of the market for loyalties are equally revealing in the so-
called transition societies-those moving away from monopoly control over
imagery to a more pluralistic competitive structure. Benedict Anderson's
compelling insight that every nation is "an imagined political community"
helps explain trends in these emerging nations. The contest for control over a
nation's identity is greatest where new-found independence leads to attempts
to seize the popular spirit and fill it with ideas of loyalty. These public efforts
have a special poignancy where a nation has the actuality of statehood, but not
its full blossom. In Central and Eastern Europe, and in the independent states
that have emerged from the former Soviet Union, wholesale transformations
of the market for loyalties are occurring. These transformations discredit the
old, substitute the new, and will have important consequences for issues of
stability and the establishment of democratic values. These communities will
not achieve cohesion without a substantial public involvement in defining,
organizing, and propounding a credible and pluralistic national identity.67
In each of the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union,
centralized television, the residue of the state monopoly over imagery, is
65. Case 353/89, Commission v. Netherlands. 1991 E.C.R. 14069.
66. BENEDICT ANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNMES 6 (rev. ed. 1991). see also Arjun Appadurai.
Disjuncture and Difference in the Global Cultural Economy. PtIB. CULTURE., Spnng 1990, at I.
67. In Belarus, a draft broadcasting bill in 1994 called for the mass media to -pursue a policy of
strengthening public consent, avoiding extremist articles and abstming from utterances that harm the
spiritual and moral health of the masses." Oleg Manacv. Belarus: New Princples. New Broadcasting Bill.
POST-SOVIET MEDIA L. & POL'Y NEWSL., Apr. 30. 1994. at 2. As part of another transition, the document
of accord in the Middle East provided for possible radio and television stations for the Palestinians,
Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Govemment Arrangements. Sept. 13. 1993. Isr,-P-LO.. annex I.
I 2(c), 32 I.L.M. 1525, 1535 (1993).
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searching for a role in shaping identity while a new market slowly emerges."
The dynamism of this new market is evidenced by the extent of efforts to
restrain it. In Moscow, Russian nationalists rail against the incursion of images
from the West that have followed "privatization."69 The recently reconstituted
Russian Duma, in one of its first initiatives, sought to compel state
broadcasters to carry its proceedings, explaining that the President and other
competing forces have their own modes of affecting the range of available
narratives.7" Control over at least some of the instruments of imagination
symbolizes an attribute of sovereignty. As a result, throughout the former
Soviet bloc, governments have placed limitations on foreign investment in
broadcast stations. Poland caps foreign investments in broadcast stations at
33%, while Slovenia has an absolute bar on foreign investment in broadcast
stations, though it is currently considering a more lenient rule.7 Governments
also impose domestic content requirements. For instance, under temporary
licenses granted by the Estonian government, private broadcasters cannot
allocate more than 30% of air time to foreign programming. Also, Poland
at one time required stations to allocate at least 30% of air time for
domestically produced programming. Later, by decree of the National
Broadcasting Council, the government set higher quotas: 60% for the national
public television channel and 45% for the national commercial television
channels.
73
There are standard elements to chronicles of identity, just as there are in
other kinds of dramas. These elements, usually managed by the government
or dominant groups in society, include histories of origins, of blessedness, of
chosenness, of victimness, and of redemption-the basic ingredients of
successful nationhood. The traditional task of communication is to adapt these
elements, invigorate them, alter focus, and provide new tropes of legitimacy.
In the socialist period, as part of the redemptive mode, the media carried
stories of economic progress and accomplishment central to projections of
pride and virtue: five-year plans, great hydroelectric structures, happy
68. See Frances H. Foster, Izvestiia as a Mirror of Russian Legal Reform: Press, Law, and Crisis in
the Post-Soviet Era, 26 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 675, 678-84 (1993); Peter Krug, The Abandonment of
the State Radio-Television Monopoly in the Soviet Union: The First Step Toward Broadcasting Pluralism?,
9 WIs. INT'L L.J. 377, 377-78 (1991).
69. See, e.g., Shakeup at Russian Federal Press Committee, Mironov Dismissed for Nationalist Boasts,
POST-SOVIET MEDIA L. & POL'Y NEWSL., Sept. 10, 1994, at I (recounting firing of press committee chief
previously attacked "for pro-nationalist sentiments and intemperate calls for more government control of
the media").
70. See On Covering the Duma: A Parliamentary Dialogue with Mikhail Poltoranin, POST-SovIET
MEDIA L. & POL'Y NEWSL., Mar. 31, 1994, at 12.
71. Committee of Experts on Media Concentrations and Pluralism, Study on Media Concentrations
in Central and East-European Countries (updated version), MM-CM(94)17 app. at 49.
72. Id. at 52.
73. Id. Under the Polish scheme, domestically produced primetime and first-run programs counted for
a multiple of the minutes they were on the air, while re-runs counted for less. This scheme further
encouraged new domestic production. Id.
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collective farms. And art reinforced this pervasive message: photographs of
brave workers, sculptures of soaring muscular figures, buildings designed in
a massive Stalinist style.7" In the early days of the transition, images of the
Berlin Wall coming down saturated the airwaves. Now, the state-regulated
media of the transition societies carry the imagery of the new economic
progress: conventions of foreign investors, ribbon-cutting ceremonies
announcing the opening of joint ventures to manufacture Western products, and
the arrival of American rock stars or French officials.
Renata Salecl, the Slovenian sociologist, has discerned another pattern
among the media of Central and Eastern Europe, finding replications of stories
of the communist period on the postcommunist screen. During the communist
period, for example, state-sponsored imagery cast the development of socialism
as a two-stage process. Through the images, "'the terror and the sacrifices of
the ... first stage are legitimized as a necessary moment on the path towards
the future opulent society."" This familiar approach is echoed, Saleci
suggests, in modern depictions of two stages of democracy, in which it is
necessary to "limit democracy in current society for the sake of future
democracy. ''76 Today's economic sacrifices lead the way to the free-market
abundance of tomorrow. In both instances, the account justifies arguments for
unity against impatience and caution in criticizing public officials."
Relative to other eras, the socialist period had the luxury of monopoly.
71
At present, the question is whether new national identities can compete with
foreign popular imagery. During the early period of the transition, identity
found voice in the folk songs of the past, in the vaunting of ethnicity, in the
resurrection of neglected languages, and in the projection of positive images
of suppressed minorities. But these images, which tend to be amateur
depictions, face devastating competition from the more technologically
sophisticated Western music videos and motion pictures. Without restrictions
upon competition, they cannot compellingly capture an audience and succeed
in the task of building loyalties. Without high-quality local production,
74. See MATTHEW CULLERNE BOWN. ART UNDER STALIN 81-82. 168-69 (1991)
75. RENATA SALECL, THE SPOILS OF FREEDOM: PSYCHOANALYSIS AND FE.MINISM Af-I"ER T'HE FALL
OF SOCIALISM 98 (1994).
76. Id.
77. In the fragments of the former Yugoslavia. the media. presumably under some form of state
influence, played a crucial role by filling the mental vacuum "not only with images of hatred of other
nations but also with images of the *happy' future which was to amve with national liberation." Id- at 73
A letter to the editor of The New Yorker in 1994 emphasized the first part of the equation
Federal Yugoslavia had six media monopolies-one in each republic. When the Slovenian.
Croatian, and Serbian ones fell under chauvinist control. Yugoslavia's fate was scaled. In
addition to the propaganda barrages of distortions and lies mounted by all three television
networks, every possible measure was taken to hermetically isolate their respectic captive
audiences .... An independent Yugoslav journalist writing on media gangstensm in the murder
of Yugoslavia called television "the cathode of evil."
Karolina Udovicki, NEW YORKER, May 23, 1994. at 10. 12.
78. See SALECL, supra note 75, at 41 ("The 'restoration of order' [in the socialist state also required
purges in the media and the regaining of total control over information.")
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repetitious advertising messages and other versions of Western imagery will
occupy much of the psychic space.
It is popular now to suggest that the state, in these transitional societies,
should play virtually no role in the market for loyalties. Especially from an
American perspective, the claim is that a rigorous free speech regime, in which
government does not play a role in managing or organizing the market, is the
desired outcome. But merely calling for a free market for programming ignores
the need to consider the proper role of the state and the relationship of imagery
to sovereignty. Nor does this argument adequately consider the complex
relationship between the government and the market within the United States,
the bastion of First Amendment freedoms.
II. THE UNITED STATES AND THE MARKET FOR LOYALTIES
Law affects narratives of identity in the United States, but in far less
apparent ways than in Europe and elsewhere. Basic to the American sense of
itself is the historical aversion to the idea that government shapes, or has any
role in mediating, national identity. In other words, the state's role in the
structure of speech and media is and ought to be minimal. From its
revolutionary beginnings, America's concept of central government was
different from that of its European counterparts. Limitation was at the heart of
the founding vision. The articulation of denial, an injunction against
abridgment, shaped the constitutional role of Congress in relation to free
speech. The nineteenth-century frontier mentality, still flaunted and still
generative of the American character, was framed in antigovernment terms.
Gritty independence, in action as well as speech, remains one of the key
elements of American national identity.
Great spaces, protected by the insular nature of the continent, contribute
to a history in which a comfortable dominant narrative of national identity
persists, though now and then it is challenged by competitors. Unlike its
European counterparts, the United States was buffered from attack. In the
twentieth century, the continental United States has not suffered the debilitating
wounds of bombardment, actual invasion, or occupation, either physically or
culturally. Until recently, an isomorphic relationship between dominant
language and space existed in America. There was less of a perceived need for
the state to intervene and mediate among contending cultures, except, as in the
great periods of immigration, to engage in a process of acculturation.
Beneath the calm of a set of accepted stories, however, the national
identity of the United States has always been subject to dispute. The disputes
range from contested colonial settlement to sharp regional disparities, through
the Civil War, and the rise and decline of cities, to the current contests over
race, gender, and language. For most of the twentieth century, broadcasting has
provided an envelope of seeming homogeneity, helping to produce and
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reinforce a national identity of domestic security and economic growth. Even
now, as history is told and retold, we see a struggle to redefine American
national identity, to determine how plural it should be." Because each
formulation of national identity has consequences for the distribution of power,
the contest for the regulation of images arouses great passion."
A. The First Amendment and the Market for Loyalties
In considering the place of law in structuring the market for loyalties in
the United States, the First Amendment is the appropriate starting point,
particularly because it is so commonly thought to limit, if not bar, a forceful
governmental role in organizing and disciplining speech.' Throughout
American history, however, the interpretation and application of the First
Amendment has had a vital role in shaping the market for loyalties.' - The
First Amendment can be read as an allocation of regulatory authority among
those who control the market for loyalties rather than a mandate for unfettered
speech. Under this interpretation, the First Amendment represents an agreement
among existing governors of identity (i.e., the states and private enforcers of
moral rectitude) to prevent Congress from competing with them." The First
Amendment, read literally, precludes only Congress from "abridging freedom
of speech and of the press." Despite the celebration of reason and liberty in the
late eighteenth century, there were severe local limitations to permissible
79. See, e.g., Kenneth L. Karst. Paths to Belonging: The Constitution and Cultural ldenttn. 64 N C
L. REv. 303 (1986) (proposing means by which the Constitution can aid outsiders in search for cultural
identity both through allowance of inward focus and outward acculturation); Man J. Matsuda. 1ices of
America: Accent, Antidiscrimination Law and a Jurisprudence for the Last Reconstrunton. 100 YALE LJ
1329 (1991) (proposing Title VII doctrinal scheme intended to promote linguistic pluralism)
80. See Monroe E. Price. Controlling Imagery: The Fight over Using Art To Change Soi -tr. AM
ART, Summer 1993, at 2; see also EDWARD S. HERMAN & NOAM CIIOMSKY. MANUI-A"TURING CONSaNr
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE MASS MEDIA 16-18 (1988) (critiquing pervasise control of national
narrative).
81. As in most markets for loyalties, federal and state governments have been called upon to set the
outer limits of who can compete and who presents a sufficiently *'clear and present danger" to require
exclusion. Schenck v. United States. 249 U.S. 47. 52 (1919); see. e.g.. 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (1988)
(criminalizing advocacy of overthrow of government). For state statutes on sedition. sec ALFRED H. KELLY
& WINFRED A. HARBISON, THE AMERICAN CONSTTurlON: ITS ORIGINS AND DEVELoPMtE.cr 909-11
(1976). For a recent general discussion, see Alan I. Bigel. The First Amendment and National Security The
Court Responds to Governmental Harassment of Alleged Communist Sympatlizers. 19 Oiiio N.U L REv.
885 (1993).
82. See David Yassky, Eras of the First Amendment. 91 COLUM. L REV 1699 (1991) (tracing
understandings of First Amendment in different periods). See generally LEONARD W. LEV y. EtERGENcE
OF A FREE PRESS (1985). Consider, for example, the Free Exereise Clause's specific protection of the right
of religions to participate in the market for loyalties. The Clause. as interpreted, has both expanded and
limited the range of techniques religions may utilize. See. e.g.. Reynolds v. United States. 98 U.S. 145. 166
(1878) (holding that while Free Exercise Clause protects beliefs. it does not protect all practices). The
Establishment Clause precludes Congress from following the British example of tying national identity to
a single church. Yet there is no similar explicit prohibition against "establishing- a press or set of speakers
through subsidy.
83. Cf Richard A. Posner, Free Speech in an Economic Perspective. 20 SUFFOLK U L REV. I. 3-7
(1986) (discussing jurisdictional and linguistic interpretations of First Amendment).
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speech and conduct as well as harsh sanctions for breaching local bounds.'
The adoption of the First Amendment did not halt the ongoing process of
setting and implementing standards. To the young states and other cultural
regulators like the eighteenth-century churches, the power to control speech
and behavior was too important to be shared with the new central
administration. The early First Amendment, as an artifact of federalism,
defined the forum for erecting barriers to entry, restricting output, or dividing
markets. Without the First Amendment, a new federal congress, reflecting a
new assortment of interests, might have threatened the existing power
relationships between states, other cultural forces, and the press."
The structuring role of the First Amendment changed as society changed.
While the Amendment reinforced the decentralized regulation of speech in the
eighteenth century, by the twentieth century it served to promote a national
market for speech. Through its incorporation into the Fourteenth Amendment
and its application to state and local governments, the Free Speech Clause
became a mechanism to inhibit the states and facilitate the development of a
national market for speech and identity. As a result, the Clause blocks state
and local governments from prohibiting specific points of view and diminishes
their capacity to shield and nurture regional audiences.86 In this new
environment, the erosion of local impediments to the national market for
speech was virtually inevitable.8
America's television service grew in soil so remarkably nourishing that the
process of psychic integration took place much earlier and more rapidly in the
United States than in Europe. That process has largely been successful, for
better or worse, in the United States, yielding the internal "cultural space" that
is the aspiration of the Council of Europe. The creation of an interstate
broadcast medium reinforced the whole's triumph over the identity of its local
84. See Yassky, supra note 82, at 1702, 1710-17.
85. Donald J. Boudreaux & A.C. Pritchard, Rewriting the Constitution: An Economic Analysis of the
Constitutional Amendment Process, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 111, 135-36 (1993); see Wilfrid E. Rumble,
James Madison on the Value of Bills of Rights, in 20 NOMOS 122, 136 (J. Roland Pennock & John W.
Chapman eds., 1979) (discussing rejection by Senate of bill limiting state restrictions on rights of press);
see also Akhil R. Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 1147-52 (1991)
(considering First Amendment's structural and historical purpose of safeguarding rights of popular majority
against Congress); Harry N. Scheiber, Federalism and the Constitution: The Original Understanding, in
AMERICAN LAW AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER 85, 87 (Lawrence M. Friedman & Harry N. Scheiber
eds., 1978) (examining differing attitudes of Framers and Anti-Federalists toward state sovereignty).
86. The practice of Southern states censoring abolitionist literature, for example, is traced in W.
SHERMAN SAVAGE, THE CONTROVERSY OVER THE DIsTRIBUrTION OF ABOLMON LITERATURE 1830-1860
(1938); see also RUSSELL B. NYE, FErERED FREEDOM: CIVIL LIBERTIES AND THE SLAVERY CONTROVERSY
1830-1860 (1949); Michael Kent Curtis, The 1859 Crisis over Hinton Helper's Book The Impending Crisis:
Free Speech, Slavery, and Some Light on the Meaning of the First Section of the Fourteenth Amendment,
68 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1113 (1993).
87. Cf. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (limiting state-authorized defamation
and libel actions). Obscenity, as considered in Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973), is also affected by
a "national" constitutional standard that limits the scope of local standards. See also Capital Cities Cable,
Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691 (1984) (holding federal regulations preempted application of Oklahoma's
alcoholic beverages advertising ban to out-of-state signals carried by cable operators).
686,.. [Vol. 104: 667
1994] Market for Loyalties
parts. Not only has the First Amendment created a common market for speech
within the United States, s8 it has also insulated internal competitors for
loyalties from foreign competition. Ultimately, the First Amendment allows the
government to limit the entry of voices from abroad under specifically
circumscribed powers.8 9 For example, the United States sought in 1950 to
limit, by multilateral treaty, directional broadcasting emanating from Mexico,
Canada, and elsewhere, partly as a control on content.9 Officials of the
United States Information Agency (USIA), under legislation implementing the
1949 Beirut Agreement, must certify the "authenticity" and "accuracy" of
American-made documentary films for duty exemptions in their intended
country of import, prior to their export. 9' Under the Foreign Agents
Registration Act (FARA), 92 Congress has required, inter alia, the labeling of
certain imported films as "political propaganda." 93  National security
88. In my view, the First Amendment is. in this narrow sense, a predecessor of the European Union's
Broadcasting Directive.
89. See generally Burt Neubome & Steven R. Shapiro. The Nlon Curtain America's National Border
and the Free Flow of Ideas. 26 WM. & MARY L. RE%, 719 (1985) (looking at America's national border
as barrier to free trade in ideas). In the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952. Congress authorized the
denial of visas to aliens who "advocate the economic. intemational, and goemmental doctrines of ssorld
communism or the establishment in the United States of a totalitanan dictatorslip 8 U S C
§ 1182(a)(28)(D) (1988); see also Kleindienst v. Mandel. 408 U S. 753 (1972) (upholding denial of visa
to Ernest Mandel. Marxist author invited to Stanford University conference). Justice Blackmun reasoned
that to rule in favor of Mandel because of his professional accomplishments might reinforce a
discriminatory bias in First Amendment protection for "the articulate, the well known, and the popular."
Id. at 768. This incident was no mere Cold War anomaly. In 1917. Congress had already enacted a law
requiring deportation of "any alien who at any time after entry shall be found advocating or teaching"
forcible overthrow of the government. See Immigration Act of 1917. ch. 29. § 19. 39 Stat. 874. 889
90. North American Regional Broadcasting Agreement (NARBA). Nov. 15. 1950. II U ST 413; see
Stephen D. Bayer. Comment. The Legal Aspects of TV Marti ii Relation to the Law of Direct Broadcasting
Satellites, 41 EMORY L.J. 541 (1992): Pamela S. Falk. Note. Broadcasting from Enems, Territory and the
First Amendment. The Importation of Informational Materials from Cuba Under the Trading with the
Enemy Act, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 165 (1992). According to Radio Cuba. the United States had intensified
its invasion of Cuba's airwaves, first promoting illegal emigration and then detemng it. The broadcast
claimed that the U.S. policy was in violation of International Frequency Registration Board regulations and
that U.S. telecommunications authorities "allowed unlicensed short-wave stations to broadcast from the
United States and to use frequencies intended for amateur radio and civil defence purposes." Roberto
Morejon, Radio Havana Cuba, Sept. 6. 1994. quoted in Britsh Broadcasting Corporation. Evening
Information Review. Sept. 9, 1994, available in LEXIS. News Library. Cumws File; see also Fidel Castro.
Address, CNN Transcript 914-2, Aug. 24. 1994. avadable in LEXIS. News Library. Curows File.
Competitors of Fox Broadcasting Corporation filed a petition with the Federal Communications Commission
(FCC) in 1994 opposing waiver applications for delivery of signals originating in the United States to be
beamed back into the country by its Mexican VHF affiliates (who could reach large populations in San
Diego and El Paso). Fox. which sought the waivers for the broadcast of professional football games.
claimed that any prohibition on transborder affiliation agreements was inconsistent with NAFTA. Jub
Shiver Jr., Fox's Live NFL Telecasts May Violate FCC Trade Rules. L.A. TI.iES. Aug. 17. 1994. at DI;
see also Application of American Broadcasting Cos.. 35 F.C.C.2d 1. 5 nn.lO- I (1972).
91. See Scott Lewis Landsbaum. Note. How To Censor Films Mthout Really Trying: The Beirut
Agreement and the Foreign Agents Registration Act. 62 S. CAL. L. REv. 685 (1989). For example. Bullfrog
Films. Inc. was rejected for an export certificate because the USIA found that its documentary In Our Own
Backyards: Uranium Mining in the United States was unrepresentative, misleading, and inaccurate. Bullfrog
Films, Inc. v. Wick, 646 F. Supp. 492, 496 (C.D. Cal. 1986). aff'd. 847 F.2d 502 (9th Cit. 1988).
92. 22 U.S.C. §§ 611-621 (1988)
93. Id. § 614(b). For a discussion of FARA. see Meese v. Keene. 481 U.S. 465. 469 (1987); see also
Brian C. Castello. Note. The Voice of Government as an Abridgement of First Amendment Rights of
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considerations limit the flow of information into or out of the United States.94
Thus, the extent of Congress' power to limit the flow of ideas into or out of
the United States is greater than its power to constrain and organize the
internal market for loyalties. Nonetheless, the First Amendment continues to
protect the internal dominant suppliers of national identity from challenges
within and outside of the national territory. The ability of the national
government and the First Amendment to continue to do so will be seriously
challenged with advancements in communication technology.
B. Regulation of Media and the Market for Loyalties
The day-to-day work of shaping and regulating the broadcast market for
loyalties falls to the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), an
organization with a tight and traditional relationship with Congress, the White
House, and the industry it oversees. While the Communications Act of 1934
prohibits the FCC from engaging in censorship,95 the very process of
licensing radio and television stations acts as a major constraint on the
competition for loyalties.96 Competition for federal licenses and the
requirement of a renewal (every three years in television's "golden age")
inevitably affect the range of views expressed. While that range has been quite
wide, and renewal of licenses is typically automatic, the possibility that a
valuable asset could be lost is an effective argument for conformity. The
powers of the FCC, Congress, and the White House have all been used as
weapons in the battleground for competing notions of the good, the ideal
model for organizing and directing society, basic ideas of cohesion, and the
definition of community.
97
Government-mediated actions have had important consequences for the
narrative of national identity.98 During the McCarthy era, the authority of
Speakers: Rethinking Meese v. Keene, 1989 DUKE L.J. 654; Anne Dorfman, Note, Neutral Propaganda:
Three Films "Made in Canada" and the Foreign Agents Registration Act, 7 COMM/ENT L.J. 435 (1985);
Note, Government Exclusion of Foreign Political Propaganda, 68 HARV. L. REV. 1393 (1955).
94. HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION 200-01 (1990); see, e.g., Falk,
supra note 90, at 170-71, 182-84; Thomas G. Havener, Note, Assault on Grenada and the Freedom of the
Press, 36 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 483 (1986).
95. 47 U.S.C. § 326 (1988).
96. Much of American regulation of broadcasting has rested on scarcity grounds. See Red Lion
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 376 (1969). Commentators have derided this rationale because of
the manufactured nature of the shortage. See, e.g., BRUCE M. OWEN, ECONOMICS AND FREEDOM OF
EXPRESSION: MEDIA EXPRESSION AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 91 (1975).
97. See LEE C. BOLLINGER, IMAGES OF A FREE PRESS 74 (1991) (discussing regulatory efforts to
protect "quality of public discussion and decision making"); STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN, THE FIRST AMENDMENT,
DEMOCRACY, AND ROMANCE 156-57 (1990) (discussing social engineering in the First Amendment area).
Cass Sunstein's "New Deal" for speech explicitly proposes a closer match between permissible regulation
and the objective of achieving certain societal goals. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 3, at 81-88.
98. One could start with the issue of whether licenses should have been granted locally or regionally
and what role government had, or could have had, in determining how powerful the national networks
would become. Thus, an FCC action as mundane as determining whether to enforce an obligation for local
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Congress and the FCC was enlisted to sanitize the airwaves of left-wing
sentiment. In the 1960's, Presidents Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon used
the "fairness doctrine" and the licensing process to intimidate broadcasters who
challenged their views. Nixon, for instance, sought to punish The Washington
Post by threatening the economic security of the television stations owned by
its parent company.99 Nixon also sought to reduce the central power of public
broadcasting because, in his view and that of Vice President Spiro Agnew, the
noncommercial system was creating allegiances hostile to conservative
values."° In the 1980's, through the introduction of preference rules, the
FCC sought, at least cosmetically, to assure minority ownership of broadcast
media on the understanding that ownership has implications for on-screen
narratives.'0 ' In addition, during the 1960's and 1970's, groups used the
FCC's licensing process-which permits challenges to the renewal of a
broadcaster's license-to change the practices (in terms of employment and
representation of groups) of licensees and networks."' 2 In these ways, to the
extent they could manage to bring the power of the state behind their
perspectives, law and regulation were deployed to strengthen the interests of
one interest group or another and to limit entry by ideological competitors." 3
Despite widespread government involvement in the market for loyalties,
American jurisprudence is deep in denial of the relationship between
stations to serve as an outlet for local voices could favor Hollywood over Main Street. and in so doing.
affect the mix of imagery.
99. See MARILYN A. LASHNER, THE CHILUNG EFFECT IN TV NE'ws: INTIMIDATION BY THE NIXON
WHITE HousE 189 (1984) (describing presidential requests for retributive antirust investigation. threat of
antitrust action. FCC monitoring, and tax investigation): WILUAM E. PORTER. ASSAULT ON TIlE MEDIA'
THE NIXON YEARS (1976) (describing wide-ranging government effort to intimidate. harass, regulate, and
damage news media).
100. See PORTER, supra note 99, at 145 (describing Nixon White House attitude and efforts). Public
broadcasting remains under severe attack from critics who seek to restrain it from being "'nonobjectve.
unbalanced, indecent, or elitist." Howard A. White. Fine Tuming the Federal Government's Role in Public
Broadcasting, 46 FED. COMM. L.J. 491, 501 (1994). The Corporation for Public Broadcasting now is
obliged to review national public broadcasting programming and take necessary steps to facilitate
objectivity and balance. 47 U.S.C. § 396 (Supp. IV 1992).
101. See Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990) (holding that FCC minonty ownership
program does not violate due process).
102. Cf Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir-
1966). A television station in Jackson. Mississippi. in violation of the FCC's *'fairness doctinne."
determined, at the height of the civil rights movement, that it would favor programs advocating the
preservation of racial segregation. When national news reports showed civil rights leaders in a favorable
light, the station would put a card on the screen saying that weather. or circumstances beyond its control.
interfered with the delivery of the national signal. The Citizens Communications Center sued, arguing that
the station, a supposed instrument of discourse on the key issues facing the public, was in fact blocking
discourse. The court found that representatives of the listening public did have standing to challenge the
renewal of the license.
103. Patrick M. Fahey, Comment, Advocacy Group Boycotting of Network Television Advertisers and
Its Effects on Programming Content, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 647 (1991). Fahey primarily deals with boycotts
as mechanisms to mobilize advertisers to affect content, but implicitly deals with the power of government
to withdraw valuable licenses. Cf Ronald K.L. Collins & David M. Skover. Colloquy: The First
Amendment and the Paratroopers' Paradox: The First Amendment in an Age of Paratroopers. 68 TEx. L
REV. 1087 (1990) (discussing paradox in conflict between First Amendment values and amusement-centered
culture).
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government and imagery. The most recent example is Justice Kennedy's
opinion for the Court last term in Turner Broadcasting.14 The Court's
decision upheld (albeit narrowly and grudgingly) the power of Congress to
mandate by statute that cable operators use some of their abundant channels
to transmit the signals of both commercial and noncommercial over-the-air
broadcasters.'0 5 Justice Kennedy could only reach this result by including an
account of broadcasting regulation that, at least from the point of view of those
concerned with "public interest" considerations, devastatingly rewrote the
history of federal practice. The issue before the Court was whether Congress
could require cable operators to carry one set of speakers (broadcasters such
as NBC or PBS) at the expense of cable networks such as Disney or Discovery
or CNN."0 6 To satisfy his own reading of the First Amendment, Justice
Kennedy needed to demonstrate that the statute was content-neutral' by
showing that there was no content-related basis for either federal broadcasting
regulation or the congressional obligation imposed on cable operators. As a
result, Justice Kennedy pushed aside long-standing congressional efforts to
make broadcasters publicly accountable. By reconstructing the past to show
that the FCC had only minor functions with respect to the impact of
broadcasting on society, Justice Kennedy avoided the notion that broadcasters
have a special content-related purpose in society. According to Justice
Kennedy, "the FCC's oversight responsibilities do not grant it the power to
ordain any particular type of programming that must be offered by broadcast
stations."'' 0 8 Furthermore, "given the minimal extent to which the FCC and
Congress actually influence the programming offered by broadcast stations, it
would be difficult to conclude that Congress enacted must-carry [rules] in an
effort to exercise content control over what subscribers view on cable
television.' ' "°
To be sure, the FCC has never been a very heavy regulator of the
television medium and has been subject to intense criticism for its occasionally
sweetheart relationship with the industry. The FCC has also been at the
deregulatory end of its administrative scale for the last fifteen years.
Throughout the history of broadcasting, however, commercial licensees have
felt indirect as well as direct pressure from the government to give meaning
104. Turner Broadcasting Sys. v. FCC, 114 S. Ct. 2445 (1994).
105. The Court vacated the judgment below and remanded the case for further factual determinations.
Id. at 2472.
106. See Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-385,
§§ 4-5, 106 Stat. 1460, 1471-81 (1992) (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. §§ 614-15); see Donald Hawthorne
& Monroe E. Price, Rewiring the First Amendment: Meaning Content and Public Broadcasting, 12
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. LJ. 499 (1994).
107. Turner Broadcasting, 114 S. Ct. at 2459.
108. Id. at 2463.
109. Id. at 2464.
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to the 1934 Act's terms "public convenience, interest, or necessity.""'
Whether Congress can exert such pressure in the future is another matter,
given the Court's view that the existence of scarcity, now apparently resolved,
justified whatever morsel of regulatory power previously existed.
From the perspective of maximizing freedom, the description of federal
power contained in Turner Broadcasting is a desirable one, even if it is not
authentic. Its problematic nature, however, comes to the fore where the issue
of public or noncommercial television is concerned. Here is an area in which
the government, through subsidy, licensing, and congressional oversight, plays
an active role in the marketplace for loyalties. One could consider public
television a preeminent example of government trying to determine what
voices must be added to the mix, either for reasons of justice or to provide
outlets for expression that help legitimate the status quo. But here, too, Justice
Kennedy was rigid and narrow in his description of the relationship of
government to content. As questionable as was the Court's "history" of the
relationship between the FCC and commercial broadcasting, its review of the
function of noncommercial television was even more puzzling. Given the last
decade of tumult, sweat, congressional interference, and use of funding
priorities to shape public broadcasting, it probably came as a surprise to public
broadcasters that "the Government is foreclosed from using its linancial
support to gain leverage over any programming decisions."'. Congress can
require cable systems to carry public broadcasting stations because they
augment something called a free broadcasting service, and no other
reason-quality, education, impact on children, multiculturalism-is relevant.
Indeed, Justice Kennedy stated that if any other reason had been relevant to
Congress, the statute might have raised serious constitutional problems." 2
C. Boycotts and Group Action
Justice Kennedy's opinion in Turner Broadcasting, so grudging in its
acknowledgment of state power to create and maintain public space, is part of
a general shift in the regulation of imagery. There is a new ordering of the
market for loyalties--one that relies on a set of powers and constraints that are
more ephemeral, less visible, and less subject to the old forms of analysis.
With a diminution in the government's overt power to regulate markets, an
enriched interaction between private organizations and government influence
occurs. Government pressure to change television's stories takes the shape of
110. 47 U.S.C. § 307(a) (1988). For an exhaustive history of the section and its relation to government
shaping of the medium, see Jonathan Weinberg. Broadcasting and Speech. 81 CAL L REV 1103 (1993)
111. Turner Broadcasting, 114 S. Ct. at 2463.
112. Compare id. at 2477-78 (O'Connor. J.. dissenting) (arguing that goal of broadcast disersity is
not content-neutral) with White, supra note 100, at 498-99 (descnbing congressionally anticipated benefits
of broadcast diversity in public broadcasting legislation).
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the bully pulpit, not the censorial stick. George Bush's Vice President, Dan
Quayle, and Bill Clinton's Secretary of Health and Human Services, Donna
Shalala, both decry the television character, Murphy Brown, as an overly
romanticized depiction of single parenthood and out-of-wedlock birth." 3
Congress votes antitrust immunity to the networks so that they can negotiate
an agreement to lessen violence during the hours of family viewing.
Meanwhile, well-organized private groups, each with its own agenda, have
established outposts in Los Angeles with the aim of influencing the content of
programming and using, or threatening to use, contacts with government if
their objectives are not reached. Kathryn Montgomery, the historian of this
movement, attributes the expansion of intense, effective, and well-financed




According to Montgomery, groups such as the Population Institute, the
Alliance for Gay and Lesbian Artists, the Solar Lobby, the American-Arab
Anti-Defamation League, and Justicia have engaged in intense lobbying efforts
because "fiction programming, even more than news and public affairs ...
most effectively embodies and reinforces the dominant values in American
society.""' 5 More important, the impact of fiction may be so powerful as to
alter those dominant values. These groups would hardly be the first to believe
that those who write a nation's stories need not worry about who makes its
laws.'
16
Examples of this phenomenon are legion. In newspapers across the United
States in early 1993, a full-page advertisement placed by the American Family
Association asked television viewers to be part of a "grass roots advertiser
notification campaign." The function of the Association would be to publicize
as "irresponsible advertisers" those companies that were "top sponsors of
violence, sex, and profanity on prime-time, network TV."'1 17 The Association
would periodically inform the companies of how many families object to the
shows that were supported by their advertisements.
American Family Association director Reverend Donald Wildmon, who
placed the ad, is from the frequently vilified Christian Right, but he is far from
alone." 8 In 1994, the National Organization for Women and the National
113. See Philip Berroll, Cultural Elites, Closet Values, TIKKUN, Sept.-Oct. 1993, at 39 (discussing
liberal affinities and Quayle's comments); William J. Eaton, Shalala Revives "Murphy Brown" Pregnancy
Issue, L.A. TIMES, July 15, 1994, at Al (discussing Donna Shalala's disapproval of the television
character).
114. KATHRYN C. MONTGOMERY, TARGET: PRIME TIME 6 (1989).
115. Id.
116. "Scottish patriot Andrew Fletcher once said that if he were permitted to write all the ballads, he
need not care who makes the laws of a nation." George Gerbner, Liberal Education in the Information Age,
CURRENT ISSUES IN HIGHER EDUC., 1983-84, at 14.
117. E.g., American Family Association advertisement, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 1993, at E22.
118. Nor was he a pioneer. In the early 1970's, the National Citizens Committee for Broadcasting,
under the leadership of the charismatic former FCC Commissioner Nicholas Johnson, established a thorough
guide to violence on television and, with careful scrutiny, declared what programs were most harmful and
which companies were their major advertisers. Montgomery, supra note 114, at 108-10.
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Education Association successfully threatened a boycott of the Florida Citrus
Commission. The boycott apparently contributed to the Commission's decision
to cancel its one million dollar campaign on conservative commentator Rush
Limbaugh's show."1 9 Using whatever leverage they can, through pressure on
advertisers, corporate boards, and politicians, associational representatives
establish an agenda for public discussion and help to determine the limits of
the ensuing debate. 20 From all sides of the political spectrum, they are
concerned with the handling of environmental issues, the depiction of gays and
lesbians, the construction of narratives concerning race, the representation of
Jews and Catholics, and the stories that affect the agenda of the Christian
Right. They engage in the process of jawboning and friendly persuasion, often
using friendship ties and peer pressure. So effective have these advocacy
groups been that, in the 1990's, it has become the practice, where sensitive
questions are raised, for producers to vet scripts and seek input from the
relevant organizations even before a program is shot.
Disputes arise over the ethical distinctions that can be made between
boycotts. Nat Hentoff, criticizing the threats against the Florida Citrus
Commission over the use of Rush Limbaugh as spokesperson, argued that
boycotts are a form of McCarthyism and speech should be countered with
more speech, not economic action.' 2' Alan Dershowitz has argued that "'it
is more appropriate to boycott an advertiser who plays an active role in
determining content than one who plays no role. ' '-" Another analyst of the
constitutionality of boycotts has suggested-without irony-that a neutral line
might be drawn between boycotts on behalf of conservative and antiviolence
groups and boycotts on behalf of "social-activist and status-based interest
groups."'123 The first groups, in his view, "restrict the public's viewing
options" by bringing pressure on producers to reject certain themes, while the
second are "concerned with the lack of visibility of their views . .. [and] seek
increased access."'
'24
119. Nat Hentoff, Boycotting Free Speech. WASI. POST. Aug. 13. 1994. at A17
120. For a discussion of the constitutionality of boycotts of media for their editorial policies, see
Environmental Planning & Info. Council v. Superior Court. 680 P.2d 1086 (Cal 1984)
121. See Hentoff, supra note 119. at A17. Hentoff quotes Floyd Abrams to distinguish between an
appropriate boycott of grape growers to support C6sar Chavez and an inappropriate boycott of the Citrus
Commission over its use of Anita Bryant. who had voiced homophobic views in other fora. as a
spokeswoman:
The boycotts of California grape growers ... are against actions by those employers tn their
business-when they resist workers' attempts to get a fair wage or violate collective bargaining
rights. But Anita Bryant is being boycotted because she has engaged in speech, political speech,
that has nothing to do with her work advertising orange juice.
Id.
122. Quoted in MONTGOMERY. supra note 114. at 162.
123. Fahey, supra note 103, at 655.
124. Id. at 654-55; cf FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n. 493 U.S. 411, 447 (1990)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) ("Expressive boycotts have been a principal means of political communication
since the birth of the Republic.").
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The ethical and legal issues in the entertainment field are designed to
balance conflicting pressures. Some groups have more favorable access to
writers and producers than others-a consequence of wealth, ideology, or the
familiar networks of neighborhood and class. Other groups use their power not
only to threaten consumer boycotts, but also to secure the intervention of the
state (Congress or the courts). 5 Whenever advocacy groups passionately
articulate ideas, matters of wealth or access to power lurk beneath the surface.
In the era of deregulation, the impact of the government on the market for
loyalties may become more difficult to detect, but it is not necessarily reduced.
D. Laissez Faire and the Legal Structure
The most important way in which law impacts the market for loyalties is
not through the explicit actions of Congress and the FCC, but through the
tolerance and protection of the status quo. Modem interpretations of the First
Amendment maintain and enlarge the field for advocates of consumerism.
Television now showcases a series of stories that celebrate the consumption of
goods, promoting an idea of self that dominates competing allegiances and
ancient ideas of citizenship.126 The idea that commercial speech is to be
treated identically to noncommercial speech, that cable television operators are
speakers just as publishers of newspapers, leads to a set of narratives that
emphasize commercials while infomercials replace documentaries and
celebrities replace civic leaders.
127
A First Amendment theory that denies the very absence of the capacity to
regulate, or at least to regulate positively,128 becomes the basis for structuring
the market for loyalties in the United States. American television may provide
more channels and choices than any other system, but, ironically, it provides
less diversity and a more uniform perspective on national identity than
television in some countries with fewer channels. The United States, internally,
could be viewed as the first example of globalization, a test run for some of
the technological consequences now felt throughout the world. An institutional
history of broadcasting in the United States, one that traced its national and
125. The molding of narrative through collective action has become virtually institutionalized in terms
of informal relations between groups and government. Pressure is placed on government officials,
government officials put pressure on industry, and industry responds "voluntarily." Following the model
now so well established in the motion picture industry, Senator Joseph Lieberman recently introduced
legislation requiring regulation of imagery in video games. See S. 1823, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (daily ed.
Feb. 24, 1994). In what is now a familiarly orchestrated set of actions and responses, the video-game
industry established self-regulatory machinery to avoid more intrusive governmental intervention. See
Makers Say They'll Rate Video Games, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 1994, at 48 (discussing video industry's
proposed voluntary rating system).
126. See generally NEIL POSTMAN, AMUSING OURSELVES TO DEATH 125-41 (1985) (describing
television's contribution to rise of image politics).
127. In sum, this leads to what I call a home shopping of the mind.
128. See supra note 104 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Kennedy's opinion in Turner).
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international dimensions, would emphasize the development of the radio chains
or networks that crossed local American cultures. In so doing, broadcasting
exploited the trappings of localism but established a national market that
eventually encompassed the vast and disparate regions of the land. The oft-told
story-in which "American television" is the aggressor, becomes global, and
engulfs the rest of the world with the United States as the subject, not the
object, of cultural change-may be too simple.'29 Broadcasting in America
itself can be reinterpreted as a dress rehearsal for globalization, altering
identities here first. It is as comedian Jay Leno joked during the inauguration
of NBC's European Super Channel, "We're going to ruin your culture just like
we ruined our own."'30
A recent legal dispute illustrates the way First Amendment theory protects
the status quo. In 1992, Congress charged the FCC with redetermining whether
licensees who converted their stations into "predominantly commercial"
channels, the round-the-clock home shopping stations that specialize in ruby
earrings and diamond-cut fourteen karat gold chains, met the "public interest"
standard set for broadcasters in the 1934 Communications Act. The FCC,
which only a few decades before had found that overcommercializa-
tion-measured in minutes of commercials per hour-was inconsistent with the
public interest, determined that current home shopping channels, with upwards
of ninety-percent commercial content per hour, met the licensees'
obligation.' 3' If people watched, the FCC reasoned, a need was being met.
The vision of the country contained in the "public interest" standard hinged on
the number of viewers, not on an independent vision of the relationship
between programming and the common good.
32
III. NEW TECHNOLOGY, GLOBALISM, AND THE MARKET FOR LOYALTIES
I have tried to show how law and technology interact and affect a state's
power to organize the market for loyalties, and how a governing entity's use
of law and regulation of technological advances allow it to foster or impede
129. See HERBERT 1. SCHILLER. COMMUNICATION AND CULTURAL DOMINATION 1(1976) (*What does
it matter if a national movement has struggled for years to achieve liberation if that condiion. once gamed.
is undercut by values and aspirations derived from the apparently vanquished dommator): id. at 24 (-The
genesis and extension of the free flow of information concept are roughly coterminous with the brief and
hectic interval of U.S. global hegemony .... "); JERE.MY TUNSTALL. THiE MEDIA ARE AMERICAN 38-40
(1977).
130. Richard W. Stevenson. lghts! Camera! Europe!. N.Y. TiMEs. Feb. 6. 1994. § 3. at I
131. Implementation of Section 4(g) of the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition
Act of 1992, 8 F.C.C.R. 5321 (1993) (Home Shopping Station Issues). See generally Limitatons on
Commercial Time on Television Broadcast Stations. 8 F.C.C.R. 7277 (1993) (notice of inquiry) (recounting
history of commercial regulation).
132. In its recent decision in Turner Broadcasting. the Supreme Court embraced a minimalist view
that not only justified the FCC position. but rendered it a necessary outcome given Justice Kennedy's
theory of the case. See Turner Broadcasting Sys. v. FCC, 114 S. Ci. 2445 (1994).
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particular promoters of competing loyalties.1 33  New and changing
technologies-direct-to-home satellites, the spread of cable, and the rich
potential of the electronic highway-increasingly limit one of the most
important aspects of state power: the effectiveness of intervention by
governments to protect an internal cartel from the destabilizing cacophony of
the world. Even internally, government media policies that explicitly shape
narratives seem to be throwbacks to another era, one in which competition for
national identity could be contained.' 34 Even more in jeopardy is the
"bubble," the power of law to contain debate within traditional physical
boundaries. The consequences for law are intriguing because the passion for
using law to regulate loyalties, fence out competition, and fabricate or reinforce
national identities will not disappear. The market for loyalties persists; what
changes are the market's players, the mechanisms for control, and, finally, the
future of the state.
A. Global Competitors and State Responses
As the earlier illustrations from the Netherlands and Belgium demonstrate,
the world is now moving from a well-regulated and divided market for
loyalties to one in which constraint by national governments is almost
impossible. If one way of understanding the political essence of society is to
examine and calibrate its internal web of message sending, 35 then as codes
of interconnection are modified we must change our view of society. The
satellite, the most modern form of communication, echoes "the older
imagining," ancient forms of social organization "where states were defined by
centres, borders were porous and indistinct, and sovereignties faded
imperceptibly into one another."'136 Then, the technology and organization of
imaginings contributed "paradoxically enough [to] the ease with which pre-
modem empires and kingdoms were able to sustain their rule over immensely
heterogeneous, and often not even contiguous, populations for long periods of
time. '' 137 Now, again, kingdoms outside the established order have a similar
capability to surmount self-contained national identities.
133. The destruction of European capacities to enforce barriers to entry (at least among European
countries themselves) has been caused partly by the decisions of the Court of Justice of the European
Community holding broadcasting service, by and large, to the same Community competition standards as
other services. See, e.g., Ad Van Loon, National Media Policies Under EEC Law Taking into Account
Fundamental Rights, 14 MEDIA L. & PRAC. 17 (1993).
134. At a time when the United States seeks to open markets for its entrepreneurs worldwide, there
is something anachronistic about a statute that prohibits aliens and corporations organized under the laws
of foreign governments from acquiring a broadcast or common carrier radio license. See 47 U.S.C. § 310(b)
(1988).
135. KARL W. DEUrsCH, NATIONALISM AND SOCIAL COMMUNICATION 70-71 (1953).




Who are the candidates for these new kingdoms? They can include
dynamic and charismatic religious forces-Islamic or Christian. The
possibilities also include a rejuvenated Voice of America, a BBC World
Service given a new charter by Parliament, or other modernized extensions of
a national and propagandistic past. But mostly, these new producers, reaching
past boundaries, embrace the kind of ideology that springs from MTV, the
recognizable Western package in which the appeal to the individual is the
underlying drumbeat of advertising. Sometimes these potentates have names
in the fashion of the monarchs of old, like Murdoch or Disney. Already, a
global competition exists among the BBC, CNN, NBC Superchannel, and
Murdoch to establish hegemony over global news. Not all of these are
kingdoms that have the emotional power to sustain the imagination of far-flung
peoples, thereby replacing the current order. There is no national identity of
Murdoch, no flag or loyalty to Disney. But between religious faith and
consumerism, there seems to be passionate battle enough. The global contest
of imagery, in the next generation, more likely will not be among nation states,
but rather among clashing civilizations, defined by history, language, ethnicity,
and religion.
38
The distinguishing characteristic of this market for loyalties is the decrease
in state control. Countries that for religious or political reasons oppose the
content of messages coming from the outside must search either for
mechanisms that have a more direct impact on the behavior of the suppliers of
programming, or for harsher, though less effective, measures directed at
households. In the spring of 1994, after discussions between Rupert Murdoch
and the People's Republic of China, Murdoch dropped carriage of the BBC
from the relevant AsiaSat transponder. 39 Murdoch's action came in the wake
of his statement in late 1993 that advanced technologies such as satellites
"have proved an unambiguous threat to totalitarian regimes everywhere."' 40
The regimes with which he was dealing presumably did not appreciate the
sentiment. In particular, China protested Star TV's carriage of the BBC, which
had been critical of the regime. Star's penetration in the China market was
threatened, and Murdoch acquiesced. In Singapore, a ban on the purchase or
use of satellite receiving dishes, absent a hard-to-obtain license, is designed to
keep out those programs that are unapproved. 4' Several regional governing
138. See Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilzoaons'. 72 FOREIGN AFF. Summer 1993. at 22
One response, although apparently difficult to accomplish, would be for the government to invest more in
its own narrative of national identity. In \vestem democracies. however. the commitment to public
broadcasting seems to be declining. Cf PORTER & HASEIBACIH. supra note 17. at 170 (suggesting a
renewed role for Germany's public service broadcasters).
139. See Raymond Snoddy, Murdoch Cut BBC To Please China. FIN. TIMES (London). June 14. 1994,
at 6.
140. Id. at 6; see also Philip Shenon, A Repressed World SaYs. Beam Me Up-. N.Y TIMES, Sept.
11, 1994, § 4, at 4 (discussing Saudi Arabia and Singapore).
141. See Kieran Cooke, Singapore Caught m Media Dilemma. FIN. TII..Es (London). Sept. 6. 1994.
at 4 ("On one hand, Singapore's planners see the economic necessity of being plugged into the global
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bodies in Egypt, under pressure from the local imam, have established similar
ordinances prohibiting the use of satellite dishes.'42 In many corners of the
former Soviet Union, a strong central government has renewed its efforts to
maintain a monopoly over imagery. This has entailed censoring newspapers,
precluding the distribution of dissenting papers, tightly policing the entry of
foreign broadcast television signals, and monitoring those thought to be
attentive to foreign messages. 43 Not surprisingly, Iran vigorously attempts
to fence out foreign signals and criminalizes the watching of some foreign
programs. In these and other places, states attempt a partial or complete
withdrawal from the mainstream of world communications commerce in order
to maintain national identity and culture. 44  It is often thought that
censorship, the ancient and indispensable tool in shaping the market for
loyalties, is rendered obsolete by the abundance of technology and ease of
access. Intense partisans, however, will seek ways to enforce their norms.
Where signals penetrate, snooping and snitching may replace systematic
exclusion. Terror, too, may become the weapon of antimodernists whose views
technology has rendered unenforceable.
While it seems certain that advanced technology and multiple channels will
be introduced, it is less certain how quickly and in what technical form they
will come.' 45 States concerned with controlling loyalties will prefer the
information network.... But, on the other hand, the government is deeply concerned about losing control
over information flows within Singapore."). Control over receiving technology to alter market structure is
not new. In the 1960's, Congress forced manufacturers of television sets to ensure that both UHF and VHF
channels were available in order to increase the possibility of competition and to help support public
broadcasters. During the Third Reich, Goebbels ordered the manufacture of extremely low-cost radios,
achieved the mass distribution of People's Radio Receivers (Volksempfdnger), and assured communal
listening through an elaborate network of Wireless Wardens (Funkivarte). ERNST K. BRAMSTED, GOEBBELS
AND NATIONAL SOCIALIST PROPAGANDA 1925-1945, at 74-75 (1965); RICHARD GRUNBERGER, TIE 12-
YEAR REICH: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF NAZI GERMANY 1933-1945, at 401 (1971).
142. Mamoun Fandy, Who Is Afraid of the Satellite Dish?, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Dec. 15, 1993,
at 23. The public pressure resulting in the prohibition of satellite dishes is only a small part of the general
hatred that is aimed at the impact of foreign signals. Id.
143. See, e.g., Jeri Laber, The Dictatorship Returns, N.Y. REv., July 15, 1993, at 42 (describing
persecution and censorship of dissenters by ruling regime in Turkmenistan).
144. The easiest and most obvious barrier to entry is a limitation on the number of television channels
available for public viewing. A dramatic example of cultural protectionism achieved through a maintained
scarcity occurred in apartheid South Africa, where the government banned television until 1976. The
National Party felt that American and British programming would threaten the Afrikaans language and
undermine the "multinationalism" of its Bantustan system. See Rob Nixon, Keeping Television Out: The
South Africa Story, INTERMEDIA, Aug.-Sept. 1992, at 35.
145. In Turkey, for example, as elsewhere, the first break in the state media monopoly resulted from
satellite technology and was tolerated because the new channels carried commercial and entertainment
programming that reinforced the secular mandate of the parties in power. But the new channels were also
used by a deported imam, fueling fear of political splintering and an intense fear of competition among the
ruling parties. In early 1993, the Ministry of the Interior issued a directive banning all private television
and radio stations. Within days, the Ministry reversed part of its ruling, exempting broadcasting via
satellites from abroad. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1993,
at I 100 (1994). Those who favored the Ministry of Interior's action argued that the closures were necessary
to pave the way for a more orderly scheme for broadcasting regulation; those against it argued that the
decision was based on "the government's inclination to create a single-voiced democracy." Aksoy &
Robins, supra note 27, at 16 (quoting Ttirkiye'yi Susturuyorlar, HORRIYET, Apr. 1, 1993).
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introduction of cable television to the spread of home satellite dishes, which
can receive signals directly from abroad."4 6 Since a cable monopolist is a
domestic intermediary, states can more easily influence it. '  Electronic
inforration-delivery systems allow creative governments to monitor messages
effectively. The United States government has sought, so far unsuccessfully.
to insert decoding chips into the new information infrastructure to enable
eavesdropping when judicially or legislatively authorized.' ' Other less liberal
governments may introduce such monitoring technology without public debate.
Because news programming is such an important bearer of public
narratives, the evolution of journalism in the era of new technology attracts
special attention. If states have less control over news accounts that come
across borders, they will seek to exercise more control over journalists and the
reports they export. In 1992, Doordarshan. the Indian public broadcaster,
sought to prevent rioting by refusing to air footage of the destruction of the
Babari mosque at Ayodhya by Hindu fundamentalists; the BBC, however,
which had received satellite footage in London, immediately broadcast the
news into India through Star TV.' 49 As a result of such destabilizing
influences, formal or informal arrangements between states and large-scale
international news organizations may become more frequent. CNN, for
example, has contractual ties to governments to operate terrestrial transmitters,
to broadcast via the national system, or merely to gather information. Implicit
in these agreements is CNN's commitment to include, among the images
projected, those images more likely to reinforce prevailing governments. The
arrangement between Rupert Murdoch's News Corporation and the People's
Republic of China is a harbinger of a new kind of negotiation over the content
Finally, in July 1993 the constitutional provision establishing the state's monopoly was repealed, U S
DEP'T OF STATE, supra, at 1100, and a new provtsion was adopted allowing the possibility of
nongovernment radio and television if enabling legislation is enacted. Id. While some pnvate stations have
been reintroduced, laws securing their existence have not yet been passed. Id. Regardless. the secular state
of Turkey has other weapons that lead to censorship, such as the Anti-Tcrror Las, and the Penal Code
provisions that criminalize insulting, among other things. Kemal Ataturk (the secular state's founding
figure), secularism, Islam, the security forces, and the President. Id. at 1096
146. In rural villages, even the location of receivers has hierarchical implications- Communal reception
will impact authority less than if each home has its own television set. In the distant world of the
interactive information structure, loyalties to the virtual communities of affinity groups will replace loyalties
to the authority figures of the physical place. See DAViD MORLEY. TELEVISION. AUDIENCES AND CULTURAL
STUDIES 214-15 (1992) (implying position of receiver is expression of hierarchy in both "advanced" and
"'primitive" cultures). According to Aksoy and Robins, in Turkey. satellite dishes became "symbols of how
taboos and prohibitions [welre being dismantled." see Aksoy & Robins. supra note 27. at 16 (quoting
Hasan Cemal, Jslamcilarin Televizvon Atagi. SABAH. Jan. 13. 1993). and informal. squatter-typ radio
stations soon followed.
147. In most cable systems, even those in the United States. whether there arc 50 or 500 channels
might be less important than whether there is just one determiner of what is shown on those channels
148. See Jaheen Nelson, Comment, Sledgelianuners and Scalpels: 77e FBI Digital Wiretap Bill and
Its Effect on Free Flow of Information and Privacy, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1139. 1139-43 (1994)
149. See generally Molly Moore. When the Mob Turns Against the Messengers After Mosque Assault.
Hindus Attack Journalists, WASH. POST. Dec. 9. 1992. at C1 (descnbing assaults by Hindu fundamentalists
on Westem journalists during attack on mosque, possibly motivated in pan by "biased" coverage)
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of global news. 50 In the new hegemony of image makers and states, the
most acceptable accounts will be those of fierce crusades against commonly
defined infidels; we can anticipate the continued Saddamization of international
reporting.
Thus, those who ring the death knell of the state may ring too soon. I have
already suggested that increased acceptance of commercialization and a
denationalization of the media are also possible responses to imagery without
boundaries. If confronted with a choice between a national identity that
competes for authority and the weak product loyalties created by consumerism,
governments will choose an influx of MTV over messages sponsored by
meaningful, passionate critics of the existing political arrangements. Those in
power prefer commercials to alternate identities offered by groups such as
Islamic fundamentalists in Egypt, Basque separatists in France, or Kurds in
Turkey. Commercialization may undermine historic cultures, but it may well
be far less subversive than destabilizing political messages. In this sense-at
least in the short run-governments benefit from allowing the entry of new
and attractive commercial programming. Such programming fills the social
space into which a hauntingly competitive national identity otherwise might
emerge.
B. Global and Regional Regulation
In indistinct yet vital ways, global signals create more than unimpeded
invasion of local markets for loyalties. They also create a global competition
with a search for global rules, global cartels, and global regulation. For most
of this century, as I have indicated, the international order was based on the
assumption that national interests, constrained by borders, should be the
overriding regulatory concern. 1 ' This assumption is changing. Commentators
criticize public international institutions, which exist to serve their sovereign
members, for failing to cope with transnational developments.'52 After a long
period of desuetude, principles of human rights, which have always included
a right to receive and impart information across borders, are reappearing as the
basis for striking down national ordinances.'53
150. See Snoddy, supra note 139, at 6.
151. See supra text accompanying note 30.
152. See, e.g., Walther Richter, Wanted: A Satellite Communications Board To Sort out the ISOs,
INTERMEDIA, Aug.-Sept. 1994, at 40 (noting need for more centralized authority over International Satellite
Organizations); Yoshio Utsumi, Why the ITU Has Taken Only the First Step Towards Transformation,
INTERMEDIA, Aug.-Sept. 1994, at 36 (arguing that International Telecommunication Union must resolve
many issues to maintain its leading role in the face of recent international developments). For a general
study of the International Telecommunication Union's reform efforts, see Audrey L. Allison, Meeting the
Challenges of Change: The Reform of the International Telecommunication Union, 45 FED. COMM. L.J.
491 (1993).
153. See Case 353/89, Commission v. Netherlands, 1991 E.C.R. 1-4049; Informationsverein Lentia v.
Austria, No. 36/1992/381/455-459 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Nov. 24, 1993) (holding that Austrian cable monopoly
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Communication specialists talk of enlarging the powers of existing
international bodies, such as the ITU, or creating a new body that can establish
and enforce rules in a global market. 5 ' Because of new needs, substantially
redesigned institutions for dealing with the new technology are most likely to
emerge from this transformative period. Regional multilateral arrangements,
epitomized by the 1989 European Convention on Transfrontier Television.'
demonstrate how new technology spurs supranational forms of regulation.
These arrangements are designed to facilitate division of and to police global
markets,'56 as well as to undermine national measures that attempt to
preserve monopolistic control of the media. In a recent case challenging a
prohibition on private broadcasting, the Austrian government argued that its
legislation was "aimed at preventing manipulation of the population and the
concomitant serious disturbances of the public order."'" The European Court
of Human Rights, however, ruled that the public monopoly could not be
maintained.' 58 Thus, the locus for making decisions about the extent and
nature of permissible competition for audience has shifted from the national
level to the Council of Europe.
This shift has not been sudden. The United Nations deliberations over
international regulation of the direct broadcasting satellite twenty years ago
foreshadowed such a change.'59 A central question of those meetings,
particularly for the Western democracies, was whether a state should or could
take responsibility for subversive or unwanted communications merely because
the signals originated within its frontiers. A great number of countries, most
fervently those of the Soviet bloc and the nonaligned members of the United
Nations, sought a convention that would do one or more of the following: bar
violated freedom of expression guaranteed by European Convrention of Human Rights)
154. See sources cited supra note 152.
155. See Television Without Frontiers Directive. supra note 23 (implementing European Cons ention
on Transfrontier Television); see also Television Without Frontiers Green Paper. supra note 24 (reiessing
existing and foreseen developments in television broadcasting and outlining European response)
156. Under Article 2.2 of the Television Without Frontiers Directic. a receising state may
provisionally suspend broadcast transmissions after consultation sith the transmitting state when certain
limited standards are not met. Television Without Frontiers Directise. supra note 23, art 2 2. 1989 OJ
(L 298) at 26. Article 22 requires member states to "'ensure that broadcasts do not contain an), incitement
to hatred on grounds of race, sex. religion or nationality." Id. an. 22. 1989 0- (L 298) at 29. see
TRANSFRON'TIER TELEVISION IN EUROPE: TiE HUMAN RIGIrrS DI'It'NSION 39 (Antonio Cassese & Andrew,
Clapham eds., 1990).
157. Informationsverein Lentia v. Austria. No. 36/19921381/455-459 (Eur Ct It R Nos 24. 1993)
This argument was fashioned to meet the standards provided by the European Con%ention on Human
Rights. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Nos 4. 1950. an. 10.
para. 2, Europ. T.S. No. 5 (providing for "such .. .restrctions or penalties a.s are prescnbed by law and
are necessary in a democratic society ... for the protection of morals-)
158. Informationsverein Lentia, slip op. at 12.
159. See The Georgetown Space Law Group, DBS Under FCC and Intenational Regulation. 37
VAND. L. REv. 67, 98-140 (1984) (discussing interational regulation of direct broadcasting satellites),
Monroe E. Price, The First Amendment and Television Broadcasting by Satellite. 23 UCLA L REv 879.
883-86 (1976) (discussing U.S. role in negotiations). See generally SARA F LunItER. TItE U.%rrED STA S
AND THE DIRECT BROADCAST SATELLITE (1988).
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certain kinds of programs from direct broadcast satellites; t6° require
consultation with the government of any state whose audience the broadcast
targeted; 61 and require the prior consent of any such state before
transmitting signals. t62 The deliberations produced only a nonbinding General
Assembly Resolution, which lacked a formal multilateral mechanism for
enforcement.1 63 The United States opposed the creation of an international
standard that would establish prohibited categories of programming because it
considered such regulation incompatible with human rights and First
Amendment principles.' 6 Exhausting discussions revealed the difficulty-in
the face of technology indifferent to national borders-of achieving social
control of new instruments of communication.
No match yet exists between a global market for loyalties and a global
regulating entity. We are still at an early, frontierlike stage in the overarching
competition among global voices, and as a consequence, the underlying
consensus-the market-shaping impulse that is at the root of media law-does
not exist. Familiar instruments of change-banks, giant telephone companies,
160. One draft convention provided:
States Parties to this Convention undertake to exclude from television programmes transmitted
by means of artificial earth satellites any material publicizing ideas of war, militarism, nazism,
national and racial hatred and enmity between peoples as well as material which is immoral or
instigative in nature or is otherwise aimed at interfering in the domestic affairs or foreign policy
of other States.
Draft Convention on Principles Governing the Use by States of Artificial Earth Satellites for Direct
Television Broadcasting, U.N. Doc. A/8771 (1972), art. IV [hereinafter Draft Convention on Artificial
Satellites]. One of the taboo subjects was "[b]roadcasts undermining the foundations of the local
civilization, culture, way of life, traditions or language." Id. art. VI(e).
161. The Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) proposed the following
principles:
1. A direct television broadcasting service by means of artificial earth satellites specifically
directed at a foreign State, which shall be established only when it is not inconsistent with the
provisions of the relevant instruments of the International Telecommunication Union, shall be
based on appropriate agreements and/or arrangements between the broadcasting and receiving
States or the broadcasting entities duly authorized by the respective States, in order to facilitate
the freer and wider dissemination of information of all kinds and to encourage co-operation in
the field of information and the exchange of information with other countries.
2. For that purpose a State which proposes to establish or authorize the establishment of
a direct television broadcasting service by means of artificial earth satellites specifically directed
at a foreign State shall without delay notify that State of such intention and shall promptly enter
into consultations with that State if the latter so requests.
Report of the Legal Sub-Committee, U.N. GAOR Comm. on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, 17th Sess.,
Annex 2, at 6, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/218 (1978) (containing draft principles on direct television
broadcasting).
162. Draft Convention on Artificial Satellites, supra note 160, art. V; see Broadcasting from Satellites,
U.N. GAOR Comm. on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, 2d Sess. 32-34, U.N. Doc. No. A/AC.105/PV62
(1969) (discussing Soviet position); The Georgetown Space Law Group, supra note 159, at 115; see also
MARIKA N. TAISHOFF, STATE RESPONSIBILITY AND THE DIRECT BROADCAST SATELLITE 34 (1987)
(describing Soviet fear of harmful propaganda).
163. The final vote was 108 to 13. The debate in the United Nations was related to the general
controversy over a new international information order. See ANTHONY SMITH, THE GEOPOLITICS OF
INFORMATION: How WESTERN CULTURE DOMINATES THE WORLD 111-47 (1980).
164. See The Georgetown Space Law Group, supra note 159, at 71-89 (discussing development of
United States regulation of direct broadcast satellites in context of First Amendment).
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international trade organizations-are beginning to find their way. Being more
plastic, they mediate transborder markets for loyalties, responding to economic
and political forces, providing technical and financial assistance, assuring step-
by-step change. Since sovereignty is a difficult thing to cede, candidates for
greater international power, such as the ITU, face the obstacle of reluctant
sponsors. At some point, in the not-too-distant future, participants in the global
market for loyalties will require a stronger regulatory presence, a global hand,
invisible or not. But that moment is not yet here.
IV. CONCLUSION
National identities are, of course, quizzical imaginings: a combination of
the aesthetics of patriotism, romantic searches through the past, and the
reinvention of old myths for sometimes benign, sometimes malevolent
purposes. They can change rapidly. The nation state has always been, as Eli
Noam has written, "at tension with cross-border allegiances-whether
proletarian international solidarity, rebellious youth culture, international
financial capital, or ethnic minorities."1 65 Now, however, new networks can
weaken national cohesion while strengthening and internationalizing particular
allegiances (often among globally distributed communities). Noam notes, "It
is difficult for a state to extend its powers beyond traditional frontiers, but it
is easy for the new networks to do so."'" Thus, the audiocassettes with the
recorded voice and message of the exiled Ayatollah that were smuggled from
France to revolutionary strongholds in Iran immediately transported the fiery
zeal of the Ayatollah and helped unite opposition to the Shah. Radio gave to
the people of Moscow the sense that they were a community, stronger and
more independent than the organizers of the reactionary coup. The lesson
demonstrated by these examples is not only one of freedom; it is also the
lesson of imperiled narratives and susceptible regimes. A global market for
loyalties increasingly supplements its local counterparts, and participants in the
local markets tend, as in the market for goods, to be increasingly transnational.
Great corporations, religious entities, and programmers of signals bind together
scattered ethnic populations and others with defined interests.
The global drama of the programs and narratives that have been beamed
through the skies as a technique of the new era may have been captured best
by the gifted Polish journalist and author Ryszard Kapugcifiski. Although
describing Iran's turn to Khomeini after Westernization under the Shah, his
words have a more general truth:
165. ELI M. NOAM, BEYOND TERRITORIALITY: ECONOMICS AND POLITICS IN TELEsOCImrY 10
(Columbia Inst. for Tele-Information working Paper No. 690, 1994).
166. Id.
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A nation trampled by despotism, degraded, forced into the role of an
object, seeks shelter, seeks a place where it can dig itself in, wall
itself off, be itself. This is indispensable if it is to preserve its
individuality, its identity, even its ordinariness. But a whole nation
cannot emigrate, so it undertakes a migration in time rather than in
space.
167
In this passage Kapu~cifiski was writing of resistance to messages from the
West, a "walling in" that must use every technique possible to block the
compelling, attractive, permeating voices from without. This atavistic theory,
this turn against modernity, also suggests one of the strong motivations,
conscious or not, for the West to project the enveloping narratives of its
contemporary radio and television. There is a key here to the importance of the
stories that are pumped into the transition societies and the periphery of the
developed world, a key to the impact of the dream factories of Hollywood on
the villagers of the Carpathians, pub keepers in Wales, shepherds in the
Basque country, or workers in Azerbaijan. The rhythm and music of Western
radio and television push modernity against competing forces. Alan Rusbridger
of The Guardian caught this "full surreality of the New Media World Order"
in a village located an hour from New Delhi. 168 There, while young people
chant at the temple of the monkey-god, Hanuman, the family of Yogbal
Sharma watches MTV with its "[l]egs, lipstick, kisses, jeans, fast cars, beaches,
cafes, drink, [and] waterfalls," a representative sample of Star TV fare.' 69 In
the years to come, Rusbridger observes, children will choose whether to spend
Tuesday evening singing to Hanuman or watching Dynasty.'7"
Imagine a world of hyperbolic interactivity, a home shopping network not
just of consumer goods, but of ideologies and movements. In this mythological
telecommunications future, the boundaries that will count will be the footprints
of satellites and the reach of computer system operators. They will demarcate
the sway of the empires of production exerting their influence over the fealties
of mere consumers. It is a future in which the Third World becomes even
more marginalized, unless it becomes more of a market for goods and
therefore more relevant to the producers and distributors of imagery. The
wiring of the world, and the expansion of the technology that enables the
allegiances of consumerism, is akin to establishing the infrastructure for
resource extraction in the colonies of old. Modern broadcasting devices, once
the perfect instruments for capturing loyalties and maintaining the state, are
becoming consummate devices for undermining the established order. The new
technologies and the mechanisms that are evolving for their exploitation are
167. RYSZARD KAPU8CIISKI, SHAH OF SHAHS 113 (William R. Brand & Katarzyna Mroczkowska-
Brand trans., Harcourt Brace Jovanovich 1985) (1982).
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reducing the capacity of existing states to regulate political discourse. Even in
an era of more limited broadcast entry, some argued that Radio Free Europe,
Radio Liberty, and Voice of America helped destabilize the Soviet regime. If
abundant channels become easily accessible, universally available, and used by
powerfully charismatic, unmediated voices, then the potential for novel,
widespread, populist alliances will certainly be realized. Whether the
competitors will be the industries of faith, the distributors of blue jeans and
alcohol, or empires yet unborn, the point remains the same. The ascendancy
of the new players, the new media structure and allegiances, will weaken and
ultimately replace the now-reigning oligopolies. It is in this transformed market
for loyalties that the possibilities, however dim, of global coordination and
regulation must be realized.

